Workplace Health and Safety Culture Change

5 April 2013

Final Report

Secretariat to the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety
Preface

This report has been prepared for the Secretariat to the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety by Stephen Glover, Nicole Brown, Allana Coulon, Elisabeth Numan-Parsons, Sonia Ogier and Robyn Ward from MartinJenkins (Martin, Jenkins & Associates Limited).

Our goal is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisations we work with. We do this by providing strategic advice and operational support in the following areas:

- Strategy, Transformation & Performance
- Policy & Economics
- Evaluation & Research

MartinJenkins was established in 1993 and is 100% New Zealand owned. It is governed by executive directors Doug Martin, Kevin Jenkins, Michael Mills, Nick Davis and Nick Hill, plus independent directors Peter Taylor (Chair) and Sir John Wells.
Contents

Executive Summary .......................................................... 1
Introduction ............................................................................. 5
Problem Definition .............................................................. 6
Policy Framework and Assessment Criteria ......................... 10
Overview of Selected Culture Change Campaigns ................. 22
Key Findings and Common Themes ........................................ 25
Implications for a Workplace Health and Safety Culture Change Campaign ......................................................... 29
Next Steps ................................................................................ 32

Tables
Table 1: Five steps to develop a culture change campaign ................................................................. 13
Table 2: A categorisation of the adoption of new behaviours or workplace practice ......................... 14
Table 3: Safety belt advertising and enforcement budgets and outcomes ........................................ 42
Table 4: Funding for the anti-family violence campaign 2006-2010 ..................................................... 53

Figures
Figure 1: Accidental Fatality rates per 100,000 persons (in workplaces, on roads, in all settings) ................................................................. 8
Figure 2: Systems and levers influencing workplace behaviours ............................................................. 10
Figure 3: The Culture Web ...................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4: Billboard advertising 2009 – short journeys targeting .............................................................. 23
Figure 5: Family violence – it's not OK .................................................................................................... 24
Figure 6: EECA Energy Star ...................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 7: Bumper sticker – back seat targeting ......................................................................................... 35
Figure 8: Billboard advertising 2009 – short journeys targeting .............................................................. 35
Figure 9: Truck back advertising 2005 – ease of use ............................................................................. 37
Figure 10: Petrol pump advertising ......................................................................................................... 38
Figure 11: It's not OK – samples of the advertising campaign ................................................................. 49
Figure 12: It's not OK ... It is OK to ask for help ....................................................................................... 50
Figure 13: EECA ENERGYWISE Brand .................................................................................................. 62
Figure 14: Example of energy rating label .............................................................................................. 64
Figure 15: EECA Energy Spot – for businesses ......................................................................................... 66
Figure 16: EECA Energy Star .................................................................................................................... 68
Executive Summary

This report reviews three examples of successful national culture change campaigns – on the use of safety belts, anti-family violence and energy efficiency. We draw on existing evaluation and research material for these three culture change campaigns to identify common themes and success factors. This report concludes with advice on the implications for the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety.

The three examples chosen are all part of comprehensive programmes that combined a full range of coordinated, relevant levers to achieve behavioural change. These programmes coordinate interventions such as raising public awareness and advertising campaigns with changes to the regulatory settings, deliberate changes to enforcement activity, and measures to change the economic incentives around the particular behaviours.

In this report, we use behaviour change programme to describe this broad package of components working together to achieve the behaviour change, and we use culture change campaign to describe the specific media, marketing and other components that focus on culture change within this wider programme.

More people die in the workplace in New Zealand than in comparable countries

New Zealand has a greater risk of death and serious injury in the workplace, compared to other developed countries with similar workplace and national cultures – including Australia, Canada and the UK. The Taskforce are responsible for recommending measures that will reduce the rate of workplace related fatalities and serious injuries by at least 25 percent by 2020.

Culture is part of a complex system influencing workplace health and safety

The socio-cultural environment is an important component of a complex system influencing workplace health and safety behaviour and outcomes. This system includes the regulatory settings and enforcement, the wider economic context and incentives, the current state of knowledge and the interface with the medical system. The current regulatory model is performance-based and can be flexible to accommodate innovation and changes in technology. It can also place significant roles and responsibilities on employers, managers, employees and subcontractors to contribute to the desired health and safety outcomes.

To substantially improve New Zealand’s workplace health and safety outcomes will involve a deliberate and consistent programme of behaviour change across the different components of this system. Culture change campaigns can play an important role in this change programme.
National behaviour change programmes can contribute to improved outcomes

All three programmes – on safety belts, anti-family violence and energy efficiency – have been successful in shifting attitudes and behaviours and, generally, improvements in outcomes can be observed. However, it is more difficult to precisely attribute the outcomes specifically to the culture change campaigns within the wider change programme.

These successes have required a significant and sustained investment. Typically the culture change campaign has been developed over 10 to 15 years or more, and has been coordinated and integrated within a wider behaviour change programme. In this way, culture change campaigns have played a part within a wider set of mutually-reinforcing interventions across the system. It is also possible to identify a number of success factors in the design of the culture change campaigns.

Culture change campaigns can contribute to improved workplace health and safety

This experience suggests that culture change can also have an important role to play in improving NZ’s workplace health and safety outcomes, as part of a wider programme of behavioural change across the system influencing workplace health and safety.

Moreover, the problem definition, supported by the summary of submissions received as part of the Taskforce’s consultation process, suggests that aspects of culture may be contributing to the poor workplace health and safety outcomes currently being experienced.

An early priority will be a formative piece of research to better understand the difference between current poor workplace health and safety practices and best practice, the extent that cultural factors are driving and entrenching this poor practice, and specific factors and barriers that create this culture.

Changing workplace health and safety culture requires a sustained investment

A national workplace health and safety culture change campaign would need sustained investment for at least 4 to 5 years, and would be informed by the existing evidence base and any new formative research. Such a campaign could help to coordinate and draw together wider system changes (including regulation, enforcement, incentives and education), and would help to provide a focus for action to improve workplace health and safety by other parties (eg industry and community groups, industry leaders).
Important role for workplace health and safety agency to lead culture change campaigns

The new stand-alone workplace health and safety agency will have an important leadership role for the overall programme to lift workplace health and safety performance. The workplace health and safety agency will also need to lead the culture change campaign within this wider programme.

Reflecting the previous national behaviour change programmes, culture change campaigns can provide an important focus that draws together the different strands of the programme in a visible and tangible way. As a result, a strong culture change campaign can result in the programme to improve workplace health and safety being more effective than the sum of its parts.

A number of factors will contribute to a successful culture change campaign

The review of previous campaigns suggests a number of common success factors that can be applied to the particular challenges facing New Zealand on workplace health and safety to draw the following tentative conclusions:

- The New Zealand public need to get to the point where they recognise the specific health and safety issues in the workplace, and where they can engage with messages and debate to change culture as part of the wider programme to address these issues. For example, a number of high profile incidents created a groundswell of opinion that attitudes to family violence needed to change. While the Pike River tragedy and the subsequent Royal Commission have raised the awareness of workplace health and safety, further targeted engagement will be required to shift the public to this point.

- The workplace health and safety agency will need a deep understanding of current workplace health and safety culture, and the different potential target groups for any culture change campaign. The evidence base on where people start from, why they make the choices they do and the barriers that they face will be critical to designing a campaign that resonates with and is relevant to the audience.

- There is a need to invest in the messengers and spokespeople, before the full campaign gets underway. This will help to change the terms of debate and then reinforce the messages in the campaign. This would include working with the media to change the way they report on workplace health and safety incidents and comment on proposed changes. It would also require working with industry, sector and community groups (and staff within the workplace health and safety agency) to ensure there are sufficient spokespeople who are able to engage, sustain and progress the public debate.

- The workplace health and safety agency will need to take a leadership role for the overall programme to improve workplace health and safety, and for the coordination and the positioning of the culture change campaign within this programme. This would include
implementing a deliberate and consistent approach to achieving change and ensuring the different elements of the programme are mutually-reinforcing.

- The regulatory and economic settings need to be consistent with the desired behaviour change – so that there is a positive business case for changing the particular culture or behaviour, and to remove the main barriers to the culture change campaign. For example, in submissions there was a perception of a trade-off between workplace health and safety and productivity and profitability.

- Evaluation and monitoring should be an integral component of the culture change campaign, and of the wider programme to improve workplace health and safety performance. All three campaigns evolved and developed over their life, reflecting an iterative process that was informed by feedback on the earlier phases of the campaign and the growing evidence base. For workplace health and safety, this may mean an initial national campaign with a wide audience and a broad message, followed by subsequent phases with a greater focus on particular industries and/or target groups and/or specific behaviours or attitudes.
Introduction

The purpose of this report is to review examples of successful national culture change campaigns, and to provide advice to the Taskforce on implications for workplace health and safety.

An Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety has been established to review whether New Zealand’s workplace health and safety system remains fit for purpose. They are responsible for recommending measures that will reduce the rate of workplace related fatalities and serious injuries by at least 25 percent by 2020.

This report has drawn on existing evaluation and research material on three successful national culture change campaigns, to focus on the implications for the role of culture change as part of a wider programme to improve workplace health and safety.

In the subsequent sections, we review the current challenges around workplace health and safety, and apply relevant policy frameworks to establish an analytical framework. We have used existing evaluations and targeted interviews with key stakeholders in the relevant organisations to review the success factors and lessons from the specific national culture change campaigns. We then highlight the common themes and key findings, before applying these findings to workplace health and safety culture change to highlight some implications and possible conclusions.
Problem Definition

New Zealand has a poor workplace health and safety record. Drawing on the most recent Serious Injury Outcome Indicators (SIOI) for workplace related injuries, and applying an accident ratio triangle that draws on the approach pioneered by Herbert Heinrich\(^1\), suggests that between 2008 and 2010\(^2\) New Zealand had an average of:

- 102 fatalities per annum, at a rate of 4.1 per 100,000 workers
- 369 non-fatal serious injuries\(^3\), at a rate of 16.0 per 100,000 workers
- perhaps 15,000 near misses\(^4\), at a rate of up to 6,000 per 100,000 workers

Compared to other countries, New Zealand has a greater risk of death in the workplace. Research commissioned by the Taskforce\(^5\) shows that New Zealand’s health and safety performance for 2005-2008 ranks ninth out of nine Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries using the most consistent data coverage and definitions available, and after adjusting for differences in industrial structure. These countries include the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Canada and others against whom New Zealand traditionally compares itself.

While the probability for an individual of dying at work is low, for every workplace fatality there are a larger number of serious injuries, and a still higher number of “near misses” and “close calls” where a serious accident was narrowly avoided. New Zealand’s rate of newsworthy, visible workplace fatalities and injuries is relatively high, but it is just the tip of the iceberg. These are not “freak accidents” that only happen to someone else, many workplaces and workers are affected and everyone is at risk: the rate of workplace fatalities reflects the widespread pattern of values and behaviours in the workplace that create the environment in which these accidents can happen.

---

1 HW Heinrich (1931), “Industrial Accident Prevention, A Scientific Approach”.
2 Data for 2010 are provisional.
3 This subset is those ACC claims with a hospitalisation matched diagnosis with a 6% chance of death.
4 A ratio of near-misses to events with harm of 300:1 has been recorded in event reporting systems, and appears to be relatively consistent across industries. Near-miss strategy has been used effectively in a range of industries, including airlines, railroads, medicine, petrochemical processing, and nuclear power. For more details, see: Powell, Schechtman, Riley et al (2007), ”Sleepy driver near misses may predict accident risks”, SLEEP 30(3), pp331-342. Kaplan HS (2005), “Getting the right blood to the right patient: the contribution of near-miss event reporting and barrier analysis”, Transfus Clin Biol 12, pp380-84.
5 Lilley, Samaranayaka and Weiss (2013), “International comparison of International Labour Organisation published occupational fatal injury rates: how does New Zealand compare internationally?”. Lilley et al identify a number of caveats on the international comparison and areas where future research is required to improve the reliability of such comparisons.
In a working environment where fewer minor incidents occur there is also less risk that a serious injury or fatality will happen. A shift is needed to create workplaces that are generally safer, where the number of workplace health and safety close calls and near misses is reduced, not just the more serious incidents.

Many people will have witnessed or been involved in a workplace incident and the effects of this will be far reaching. New Zealand’s poor workplace health and safety record may be causing interruptions to business which negatively impact employees’ workplace satisfaction, morale and productivity at an individual, organisational and national level.

It is important the rate of workplace injury and fatality is reduced so that New Zealanders are safe in their workplaces, and business is not hindered by accidents that could have been avoided.

Reducing the number of all workplace health and safety incidents – from near misses to fatalities – first requires a good understanding of the factors which contribute to New Zealanders taking safety risks and/or avoiding safety protocols. Further research is essential to more definitively identify these causal factors. International comparisons and the analysis to date suggest that elements of New Zealand culture may have a role to play.

New Zealand’s higher rates of accident fatality are not isolated to workplace health and safety incidents. As Figure 1 shows, compared with Australia and the UK, fatal accidents are more prevalent in New Zealand across all settings, and specifically on New Zealand roads, as well as in workplaces.
Figure 1: Accidental Fatality rates per 100,000 persons (in workplaces\textsuperscript{6,7}, on roads\textsuperscript{8}, in all settings\textsuperscript{9})

Given the higher fatality rate across different contexts it is plausible that the attitudes and approach of New Zealanders towards safety is a contributing factor. The submissions on the Taskforce’s consultation document\textsuperscript{10} highlight a number of standout attributes of the New Zealand culture which may be increasing the likelihood of an accident, for example:

- The perception that investing in workplace health and safety practices will reduce worker productivity and profitability. This can be challenged by a better appreciation of the costs of a workplace accident. For example, an employee who is unable to work due to injury will need replacing while they are out of action, which will require training new staff or will add strain to existing staff who must take on extra work. An accident or near miss is also likely to impact others in the workplace, creating a sense of unease. Such incidents lower productivity and employee satisfaction.

- New Zealanders are well known for their “she’ll be right…” attitude. It is an optimistic outlook that means despite barriers or conditions that are not optimal, New Zealanders will continue to perform a task to get the job done. However, this attitude can also lead people to take shortcuts and risks which can carry a higher chance of causing an accident.

\textsuperscript{6} Statistics New Zealand (2010)  
\textsuperscript{7} International Labour Organisation (2012)  
\textsuperscript{8} Connor, Langley, & Cryer (2006)  
\textsuperscript{9} World Health Organisation (2011)  
\textsuperscript{10} Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety (Safer Workplaces Consultation Document, 2012) and (Safer Workplaces Consultation Summary of Submissions, 2013)
• New Zealanders are not typically keen to stand out from the crowd, and may belittle those who do. This “tall poppy syndrome” may mean that people will often avoid speaking up or behaving in a different manner if it will bring unnecessary attention. This tendency means that to be part of the group, New Zealanders may be reluctant to voice their safety concerns with those in authority, report hazards, or take precautions which others in their workplace are not following.

• New Zealand has a history of resourcefulness which is admired within the culture. Kiwi ingenuity and the “number eight wire” mentality make for a creative and inventive population. However, it can also lead to improvisation and new ways of doing things that may not follow established safety protocols or the standard practice being followed by others.

• A “harden-up” attitude is also common, where people are expected to “suck it up” and “be staunch” rather than show weakness or complain about a situation. This attitude may result in workers accepting unnecessary safety risks (and not raising safety concerns) so that they are achieving targets and perceived as hard working.

• There are a high proportion of small businesses and sub-contractors in New Zealand. It is more difficult for smaller organisations to commit to investment in workplace health and safety as some of the relevant equipment can be expensive to put in place, may be seen to be for the benefit of the staff rather than the bottom line of the business, and may never be used. In addition, responsibility for workplace health and safety risks may be pushed down to employees and subcontractors without the means or capability to adequately manage those risks.

These characteristics may be contributing to New Zealand’s poor safety record. To reduce the rate of workplace injury and fatality it is likely that a cultural shift in attitudes towards safety standards and behaviours may be necessary. New Zealanders need to realise that a workplace accident could happen to them personally or to one of their colleagues. They also need to see that taking more precaution in their job is not just about compliance or a hindrance to productivity, but about making sure everyone is safe in their work environment so that injuries are less likely.

The serious injuries and fatalities that occur in New Zealand workplaces are likely the final result of a widespread relaxed attitude towards safety precautions and risk taking. The high incidence will not be reduced without changing the underlying cultural dispositions, and individual attitudes that allow and enable accidents to occur.

Culture change campaigns have successfully helped to improve the attitudes and behaviours of New Zealanders in a number of previous national issues. New Zealand’s poor workplace health and safety record can be improved by learning and applying key lessons from other successful culture change campaigns.
Policy Framework and Assessment Criteria

Workplace health and safety outcomes are the product of the interaction of a complex system of different factors. The Taskforce’s “Safer Workplaces” consultation document summarised this system using the diagram shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Systems and levers influencing workplace behaviours**

The centre of the diagram depicts the internal features of an organisation, which directly influence the actions and decisions workers will make, and which contribute to either a safer or more hazardous workplace:

- **People in a workplace** – including their, age, gender, education, demographics, training and competence, attention and distractions.
• **Work organisation** – including the work structures and hierarchy, availability of resources, performance management systems, delegations and decision-making processes.

• **Workplace features** – including the nature and design of the relevant tasks, work environment, maintenance and modifications.

These internal features are influenced by the leadership structures within an organisation who have a direct link to the workers (such as managers, foremen, unions), and those who have the overall governance role in an organisation (such as directors or the owners). It is important that the workplace health and safety roles and responsibilities at each level of an organisation are clearly defined, so that everyone knows what is expected of them and workplace health and safety practices are upheld.

External factors such as the regulatory system, knowledge system, socio-cultural environment, economic environment, and medical system will impact on workplace health and safety practices at each level, and on the organisation as a whole.

As suggested in the problem definition, an element of culture change will have an important role to play as part of a deliberate strategy to reduce workplace harm – as part of a consistent theory of change, applied to develop a clear, coherent overall change strategy. Successful culture change campaigns can be supported and reinforced by appropriate changes in the other levers (eg by regulating to shift the expected standards, or by altering the economic incentives). A culture change campaign can also be used to support changes in the other components – eg using a culture change campaign to improve compliance with changes to regulatory standards.

**New Zealand’s Current regulatory approach**

As with a number of other countries, New Zealand’s occupational health and safety regulatory framework is broadly based on the 1974 Robens approach. This model seeks to achieve a balance between State and self-regulation. An underlying assumption is that those who create or work with the risks to occupational health and safety are best placed to identify and manage the risks, and there needs to be a robust regulatory backstop. This approach has resulted in performance based legislation which imposes duties (particularly on employers but also employees), along with a regulator that sets, monitors and enforces standards and provides guidance. Both duties and regulations describe the desired outcome, but do not provide details about how to achieve them.

---

11 Feedback on this system analysis will be reflected in the Taskforce’s final report, in particular to separately identify the role of the medical system in workplace health and safety.

12 Lord Robens produced a major report into workplace health and safety in the UK that led to the development of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the formation of the Health and Safety Executive to administer it.
The strength of performance-based regulatory frameworks is that they provide flexibility and thus accommodate new and innovative ways of achieving the regulatory objectives. The weakness of this approach is that it can create uncertainty in terms of what the employers, managers, employees and subcontractors each need to do to comply with the law and contribute to the desired outcomes.

Because responsibilities fall to different parties within an organisation, there is also the risk that tasks will “fall between the gaps”, not being completed due to people thinking their responsibility actually sits with someone else. This approach also requires a high degree of regulatory and specific knowledge and experience among both those with duties under the framework and those who enforce it, which many firms, especially smaller ones, tend not to have. Tasks could end up being delegated to parties who don’t have the capability to deliver or manage them. For example, a company that expects individual employees to make complex, technical judgements, or managers who leave subcontractors to supply their own safety gear and manage their own risks.

The underlying message is that if a performance based regulatory framework is to be effective, then the other external factors influencing workplace health and safety need to align with and support the outcomes legislation is trying to achieve. For example, a supportive economic environment will help to ensure that businesses will be able to invest in the equipment or the development of a system which supports legislative outcomes. Likewise, within a “she’ll be right” or “harden-up” workplace culture, it will be difficult to achieve good workplace health and safety procedures and outcomes, without also addressing the culture that is contributing to risk-taking behaviours.

Examining how the external factors which impact on an organisation are inter-related and affect one another will help to establish why current legislation may not be having the desired impact on workplace health and safety practices, and help to establish ways of reducing workplace accidents.

New Zealand’s underlying culture is an external factor which is likely effecting health and safety practices, compliance with legislation and helping to embed bad habits in the workplace. A programme to encourage culture change will help to improve people’s attitudes and behaviours towards workplace health and safety, so that workplace risks are taken more seriously and compliance with legislation is more likely.

**Development of a culture change programme**

The following five step process, outlined in Table 1, can be used to develop a culture change campaign within a within a wider change programme. This process draws on behavioural theory to help understand and influence human behaviour, and in turn give insight to the best ways of instigating and embedding a change in culture.
### Table 1: Five steps to develop a culture change campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Identify current and desired behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Understanding the audience(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Developing a practical model of influences on behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Building a culture change campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Developing a communications model and evaluation cycle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1. Identify current and desired behaviours

The first step is to identify the key behaviours that the intervention is trying to address. These need to be specific, tangible, and relevant to individual workplaces and employees. Current behaviours may be different depending on the industry, meaning there will be a number of behaviours which will impact on the overall goals of the intervention. For example, the risk of having a workplace injury is similar in the agriculture and mining industries, but the risk taking behaviour that leads to injury (and needs to be addressed) will be different (for example, careless driving of a quad bike in the agriculture industry, compared with managing heavy equipment in the enclosed spaces of an underground mine).

Identifying the key problem behaviours allows the development of a clear problem definition that outlines where people currently are in their attitudes and behaviours, and how these may vary across different groups (including employees, managers, wider society). An important issue is to analyse the motivations for the current behaviour the incentives and barriers that may influence whether people are willing or able to take up the desired behaviour.

The outcome should be a clearly defined set of target behaviours that are relevant and resonate with the audiences, and that can be defined in terms of the required shifts from current behaviours.

#### 2. Understanding the audience(s)

The next step is to identify and understand all the factors that influence the behaviours that are identified. These factors should be considered at a personal, social and environmental level, and are likely to differ across different audiences, such as regional, social, cultural, and industry groups:

---

• **Personal**: including an individual's emotions, habits, confidence, or exiting knowledge. For example, a truck driver could be accustomed to driving while they are tired in order to meet delivery deadlines. Or, a building firm may cut corners, reducing the costs of a project by trimming down safety equipment and procedures, in order to win a contract.

• **Social**: does the behaviour align or contradict existing social norms? Will peer-pressure impact behaviours? Who will influence behaviour changes? For example, everyone on a fishing boat may avoid wearing a life jacket, making it socially difficult for one person to take the precaution without standing out amongst their peers. Or, the truck driver from above “knowing” that all the other drivers continue to drive tired without any problems.

• **Environmental**: including price, opportunity, access, services, and proximity. For example, an organisation may require subcontractors to provide their own safety equipment, leaving individuals to purchase lower quality gear, or do away with it completely. Or, a job may require people to operate in extreme environments, such as firefighters or those in search and rescue. Those holding a “she'll be right” or “harden up” attitude would be more likely to take risks in these situations.

An important part of understanding the target audience is understanding the factors that may influence their behaviour. Roger’s Diffusion of Innovation theory can be used to assist this process by framing how different groups of people will be influenced by a new intervention, providing an understanding of why groups of people will be likely to make a behaviour change or not, and identify those groups of people who will need to be targeted over a long period of time in order to affect change. This theory is applied in Table 2 to explain the process by which new behaviours or ideas spread within a social system.

Table 2: A categorisation of the adoption of new behaviours or workplace practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innovators:</th>
<th>Eager for new experiences and willing to take risks, therefore the first to adopt. They are willing to experiment and are not invested in the status quo.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Adopters:</td>
<td>Make rational, informed decisions based on evidence and the experiences of the innovators. Likely to be in actual or de facto leadership roles, early adopters are the opinion leaders, paving the way for further adopter groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Followers:</td>
<td>Eager to comply and fit in. Based on contact with and the backing of early adopters, an innovation will hit a ‘tipping point’ within the fast followers, and the rate of adoption will rapidly increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Majority:</td>
<td>More sceptical or cautious, therefore will adopt an innovation later than average. Non-compliance tends to be unconscious, meaning in order to comply they will need to be overtly told, led or shown the new practice or behaviour. They are less likely to have contact with earlier adopter groups, slowing up-take further.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laggards:</td>
<td>Take longer than average to pick up new innovations, and may deliberately not comply. They will often have a rationale for non-compliance, which could be based on misinformation, or the result of holding to traditional values. They may be comfortable with the status quo, suspicious of new ideas, and confident that they know what is best. They may also resent or resist authority. This group is not inclined to seek out new ideas or experiences and tends to interact with similar minded people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A fundamental implication of diffusion theory is that culture change is the cumulative effect of the decisions taken by many people, and that each person’s decision to take up a new idea relies heavily on the previous decisions of those around them. For a new behaviour or innovation to spread through the majority of society, typically smaller groups of innovators must have first been attracted to the change, and early adaptors must have seen benefits from making the change and grasped it themselves.

If the behaviour change is taken-up and found to be beneficial by the innovators and early adopters then, given enough time, a tipping point should occur where the spread of culture occurs quickly and a substantial portion of society will make the behaviour change.

Once the culture change message has reached this point the difficulty will be in attracting the late majority and laggards to adopt the change in culture. Such groups need to be identified and targeted methods of informing and reinforcing the benefits of behavior change need to be developed. This may involve regional or industry based targeting which finds ways to access those social groups and workplaces which are more isolated.

3. Developing a practical model of influences on behaviour

A practical model for the culture change campaign needs to be developed which brings together relevant behaviours and influencing factors. The relationship between current and desired behaviours and what is required for change to occur must be understood.

The goal is to model the key influencing factors and understand how the factors might be working together to create the behaviour in focus. This will help to form initial hypotheses about the role and purpose of the culture change campaign.

Successful culture change campaigns use the best information and evidence available to inform what factors are effecting the target attitude or behaviour, and how those factors can be influenced so that improvements in will occur.

The Cultural Web

How the relevant factors interact and influence the focus behaviour can be envisaged through the Cultural Web14 shown in Figure 3. The web outlines the elements underpinning an organisation and helps to understand how they are interrelated. These underpinning elements are closely tied to an organisation’s internal features and leadership structures, with the underpinning elements shaping and being shaped by the internal features and structures of the organisation. The workplace based factors influencing the behaviour should fit into one of the organisational elements.

---

The Culture Web is presented below, along with examples of each element applied in a workplace health and safety context.

**Figure 3: The Culture Web**

Those elements which sit below the dotted line are easier to influence as regulatory requirements, the economic environment and knowledge systems, at the organisation or national level, can be amended, introduced or influenced to change the basis of how an organisation is run.

The difficulty is in transmitting system and regulatory amendments to those factors which sit within an element above the dotted line. These reflect the long standing culture of a working environment and for improvements to be seen will require changes in the embedded attitudes.
and beliefs of a workplace. This is where it is important that culture change campaigns support regulatory amendments, and ensure any new safety requirements are not lost on a workforce that does not believe or feel prepared for the change.

**Norms**

The design of the model also needs to consider the current norms. Norms will be different depending on a range of characteristics of the target audience, including their industry, age, gender, and ethnicity. People tend to do what those around them are already doing. It is important to test whether a culture change campaign is seeking to change an established norm and/or to create a new norm. For example:

- If the norm is desirable, let the target audience know that other people are already doing it.
- Do people have a way of talking about the subject? If they do, is this the right conversation, and if not what do they need to know to have the conversation?
- Who controls the ‘norms’ – identify the agents of change (people, innovations, formal groups, informal groups) using the early adopters to target the laggards, and involve people with positional power.
- Relate the norm to the target audience, bearing in mind the current and desired behaviours.
- Norms may need reinforcing – social conventions reflect the repeated nature of the behaviour, establishing a new norm will need repeated effort and strengthening.
- Be careful when dealing with undesirable norms – campaigns can inadvertently reinforce the undesirable activity by reinforcing the sense that it is a norm (i.e. that a lot of other people are the same as them / behave in the same way as they currently do).

**Messenger**

People are also heavily influenced by who is communicating information to them. It is important to consider the best messenger in relation to the target audience in evaluation of culture change campaigns. For example:

- In general, greater weight is often given to subject matter experts, people of influence but with no specific knowledge (e.g. celebrities) and people in authority.
- People can pay more attention to those in a similar demographic, who have behavioural similarities, or those who have experienced the upsides and downsides of the current.desired behaviour.
- People tend to trust their peers, friends and people they aspire to be like.
- It matters whether the messenger is likeable or disliked.
• Whoever the messenger is, they need to speak to the core problem being addressed (back to the personal/social/environmental factors), and it needs to be on an emotional level to influence the key drivers.

4. Building a culture change campaign

The model of influencing factors identified in step 3 needs to be developed into a broad programme of behavioural change, which may include levers such as communications, education, legislation, subsidisation, or taxation. The most appropriate lever(s) for achieving behaviour change must be identified, keeping in mind that the target behaviours and influential factors are all inter-related, so the use of one lever or intervention should not be considered in isolation.

The objective is to build a programme using levers which are best suited to addressing the target behaviour(s). It is important to understand the role of each lever and which factors/behaviours it is designed to influence and how these may vary by audience. For example:

• Regulatory systems can be used to change the workplace health and safety requirements of organisations and individuals.

• The economic environment may mean that businesses can not afford the upfront financial cost of investing in new workplace health and safety equipment or practices – meaning subsidies or grants will need to work to support new regulatory requirements.

• Knowledge systems may be insufficient, meaning employees do not understand why the new workplace health and safety requirements are relevant to them, or how to comply – requiring professional development and education which conveys the intent of changes and demonstrates what actions need to be taken.

• Culturally, even if initial change occurs, people may soon fall back to the everyday practices and habits they are use to and comfortable with – meaning a culture change campaign need to run long enough to remind and embed the new regulations.

The current environment (including public appetite for change, related community events and government programmes, or existing messages portrayed by the media) will influence people’s acceptance and ability to take on board the new culture change campaign. It is important any new communications or campaigns take stock of what is already portrayed publically and aim to work with those other factors rather than in isolation. If the current environment means people are not ready to accept the desired behaviour change, then steps must be incorporated into the culture change campaign which prime and prepare society for the imminent culture change messaging.
Salience and Relevance

People will be drawn to the messages in the environment which are salient, novel, and those which are relevant to themselves. The culture change campaign must resonate and connect with its audience, at a personal, social and environmental level.

A culture change campaign must emphasise the key messages in a way that attracts people’s attention. Other messages or activities in the environment may work with, or against, the goals of the culture change campaign, and should be considered during its development.

Layering the Message

The culture change campaign should be designed with different layers of messaging which attract the attention of different audiences, and work together to support people in making a behaviour change. The examples in the annexes point to the following strategies, which together should help to drive workplace health and safety behaviour change. For example:

1. **The “face” of a national culture change campaign** – a high profile campaign will help to get people’s attention. The “face(s)” of this campaign must be people who will attract the target audience and inspire them into action. For example:
   - The anti-family violence campaign featured a mix of ordinary New Zealanders, local celebrities and real individuals presenting their personal experience of family violence. Using a number of people with different standings and experiences to front the campaign helped the message reach a broad range of the public.

2. **A network of “on the ground” spokespeople and messaging** – national messaging should be supported by accessible, knowledgeable people who can provide information, support, and talk to the public when they have queries about the campaign and what they should be doing. People in the community who are knowledgeable in the subject area need to be prepared, so they can effectively engage and communicate the message to a public audience. For example:
   - The campaign to increase the use of safety belt utilised road safety coordinators to convey messages at a local level which supported the national campaign. Resources were provided for community education activities, which often included community events, demonstrations, use of local media and distribution of promotional material (eg fridge magnets, pens).
   - As part of the anti-family violence campaign, a community agency fund was established to enable community ownership and commitment to the prevention of family violence to spread into ‘everyday places’. Existing community
infrastructure, networks, expertise and resources (eg Women’s Refuge, etc) were leveraged to support and sustain the campaign messages.

3. **Media support** – the media needs to be equipped and able to support the overall goals of the culture change campaign. Research is necessary to determine if the media’s general understanding or perspective conflicts with the realities of workplace health and safety issues – if the media does not have a good understanding of the issues, they will be passing this on to the public. The public’s response to the campaign will be influenced by the media’s perspective. Helpful messages can be encouraged by taking the time to prepare and educate the media. This will also help to ensure media reports are helpful following newsworthy workplace health and safety incidents. For example:

- The anti-family violence campaign included a family violence seminar and guidelines for reporters which provided basic information on family violence. These alerted reporters to common myths and stereotypes and illustrated best practice for reporting family violence incidents.

4. **Informing peer-to-peer discussion** – whether or not people decide to take up the desired behaviour change will largely rely on how their peers feel about the change. Providing information in a way that inspires people to discuss the topic, and talk about the changes in a positive light, should lead to more people adopting the desired behaviour change. For example:

- EECA has developed a number of brands, which appeal to different demographics, to promote complex, sophisticated messages about being energy efficient. The brands make information accessible to a wide range of people and encourage public discussion about energy consumption.

5. **Encouraging people to speak out** – people need to feel inspired and comfortable to say something when they see another person taking an unnecessary risk, or if they are being required to take a risk themselves. Creating an environment where workers feel a sense of responsibility for the safety of their peers will help to make risk taking behaviours unacceptable. For example:

- The anti-family violence campaign modelled and demonstrated “help giving behaviour” to reinforce the idea that it is ok to help prevent family violence, and encourage people to speak-up if they knew family violence was taking place. These advertisements demonstrated actual help giving behaviour by showing ordinary New Zealanders coming forward to assist perpetrators and victims of family violence.

- The energy efficiency campaign actively recommends small practical actions to reduce energy use that are relatively easy for people to adopt and discuss – to prompt wider discussion and action (eg turning off lights that are not in use).
5. Design of the communications component within the culture change campaign

The final step is to develop a communications model which takes account of the outcomes of first four steps, and includes an evaluation plan to allow improvements and targeting to be incorporated as the campaign progresses.

From the outset, a process of evaluation and monitoring should be deliberately incorporated when building a culture change campaign. Methods of accessing and recording data must be established, so that the effectiveness of the messages and the level of behaviour change occurring can be monitored. Evaluating the programme along the way will help to make ongoing judgments about the value of the current programme, and determine its overall success.

Behaviour change is going to take time, and one message is not going to work for all audiences. The ability to obtain reliable data will help to identify areas where the messages are not effective so that the campaign can be adapted and targeted to specific audiences, reaching the laggards and driving further behaviour change.
Overview of Selected Culture Change Campaigns

As part of commissioning this report, we worked with the Secretariat to identify three national culture change campaigns that, together, would most usefully inform the consideration of a workplace health and safety culture change campaign. The three campaigns each offer a particular perspective on the role of culture within a wider change programme:

- For safety belt use, the focus was on educating the public so that individuals would see the benefits of wearing a seatbelt, and would take responsibility for their own actions and outcomes. Particular emphasis was placed on shifting the attitudes of a non-compliant minority in the context of enforcement of preceding changes to the legislation (to make wearing safety belts compulsory).

- For anti-family violence, the focus was on a cultural shift that saw individuals taking responsibility for the actions of others, with a particular emphasis on changing the overall values across society. People were encouraged to speak up and offer help in circumstances where there may be a family violence issue (rather than implicitly tolerating violent behaviour by turning a blind eye).

- For energy efficiency, the focus was on individuals contributing to better environmental outcomes for New Zealand overall (e.g. on energy use and carbon emissions). Education and information was provided to enable more rational, informed investment decisions and practical changes in behaviour to reduce energy use.

This section provides a brief overview of each of these culture change campaigns. A more detailed evaluation and review of each culture change campaign is provided in the following annexes:

- Annex One: National culture change campaign on safety belt use
- Annex Two: National culture change campaign on anti-family violence
- Annex Three: National culture change campaign on energy efficiency

National culture change campaign on safety belt use

In the mid 1990s, a campaign was introduced to increase the use of seatbelts, reducing the risk of road fatality and injury. At the time many people were regularly using seatbelts, however certain populations, such as older drivers and young males, were avoiding seatbelt use as a result of habit or misinformation.

The campaign began as a nationwide push to improve usage, but evolved to target those late adopters and laggards for whom the original messaging was not effective. To be successful, the campaign had to motivate individuals to take personal responsibility to use a seatbelt. This
required changing long-term habits, correcting misinformed beliefs about the safety of seatbelts, making seatbelts a culturally accepted part of travelling in a car, and helping people to remember to use their seatbelt.

Figure 4: Billboard advertising 2009 – short journeys targeting

As with the seatbelt campaign, a workplace health and safety campaign will need to adapt to target those groups who are lagging behind in their use of safety procedures. It will need to create a sense of personal responsibility towards keeping oneself and workmates safe in the workplace, and encourage workplaces to build a culture that accepts, requires, and reminds employees to take safety precautions.

National culture change campaign on anti-family violence

In 2006 Ministry of Social Development, in association with the Families Commission, led work on a national campaign to improve public knowledge, awareness and ultimately reduce the incidence of family violence. This was the triggered by a series of high profile family violence cases and research which suggested that New Zealanders had a poor understanding of the rates, types and serious nature of family violence.

The campaign had a nationwide focus, designed to educate all New Zealander’s about family violence, encourage a shift in attitude and behaviour towards violence, and to motivate action to reduce the incidence of this national problem.
As with the anti-family violence campaign, a workplace health and safety campaign will need to draw widespread public attention to an issue which the whole nation needs to be educated on and work to resolve. The methods this campaign used to get people talking and acting to reduce the incidence of an issue which is causing widespread harm can be drawn on when developing the workplace health and safety campaign.

National culture change campaign on energy efficiency

Energy Rating and Energy Star are part of a culture change campaign that aims to inform the public of the energy efficiency of the products they are choosing to buy, and encourages businesses to develop and sell products which are energy efficient. Energy rating labelling is used to inform consumers, and mandatory standards act to remove the least energy efficient products from the market.

The campaign demonstrates the importance of businesses and organisations as leaders in driving behaviour change. By creating a business case for the use of energy efficient products, public awareness of the benefits was lifted and the sale of environmentally harmful products was reduced without the need to use enforcement or taxation.

Lessons from this programme could help to inform the development of a business case to motivate organisations to become leaders and early adopters of improved workplace health and safety practices.
Key Findings and Common Themes

Annexes One, Two and Three provide more detailed evaluation and review of each of these culture change campaigns. In this section, we seek to draw out key findings and common themes across the three campaigns, including success factors, implementation methodology, funding and timeframes.

The analysis of these campaigns offers a number of implications that can be used to help inform the development of a workplace health and safety culture change campaign, likely as part of a wider programme to reduce the rate of workplace injuries and fatalities.

Outcomes achieved by national culture change campaigns

National culture change campaigns can be successful. For example:

- The safety belt wearing campaign contributed to reducing non-compliance to less than 5% (which was almost entirely deliberate non-compliance).
- The anti-family violence campaign shifted social norms and awareness.
- The energy efficiency product programme saved electricity use.

However, they can take time to have an effect, such as:

- The safety belt campaign took 10-15 years, building on earlier changes in legislation and as part of on-going wider efforts to improve road safety (e.g. including alcohol, speed and road quality) and, even so, its impact was limited in first 5 years.
- Anti-family violence was a 4 year campaign building on continuing community activity.
- The EECA programme is on-going and has been running for 10 years so far.

Further data and analysis will be needed to establish the extent to which the campaigns have contributed to lower overall rates of harm, and this is typically more difficult to obtain or does not exist.

Success factors at the behaviour change programme level

Successful culture change campaigns require significant and sustained investment, with the culture change campaign coordinated as part of a wider programme. All three programmes had significant, multi-year funding for the national campaign, and also invested heavily in the culture change campaign and the supporting activities:
- Safety belt wearing approximately $15 million over 14 years.
- Anti-family violence approximately $13.7 million over four years.
- EECA programme has cost to date $11.9 million, since 2002.

Successful cultural change campaigns are integrated with other mutually-reinforcing interventions to form a coherent programme that is sustained over time, and supported by activities at the local/community level. For example:

- The safety belt campaign was coordinated within a wider road safety programme, including enforcement and community level activities.

- The anti-family violence campaign leveraged existing community networks and groups giving them greater focus and prominence, by providing ‘community action’ funding and developing a community engagement model that highlighted the roles different groups could play to support change at a national level and within local communities.

The timing and use of regulatory, economic, knowledge systems and culture change campaigns also needs to be explored separately for each issue. One approach is to change legislation with the expectation that the majority of people will conform to the new rules, and then use a culture change campaign to address the laggards who were not conforming to the legislation change. The other end of the spectrum is to use a culture change campaign which primes society for the legislation change which is to follow. The current environment and appetite for change will influence which approach will work best, or if a design in the middle of the two is needed. For example:

- Legislation used to lead subsequent culture change: Starting in 1972, a series of legislative changes made seatbelt wearing compulsory. By 1996 seatbelts were used by 86% of adults in the front seat of cars. A culture change campaign was then implemented to address the laggards who were not conforming to the legislation change.

- Culture change campaigns used to lead subsequent legislation: The Energy Rating and Energy Star programmes raise the appeal and awareness of the benefits of buying and selling energy efficient products – in effect, as a premium product. Once enough people have established a new standard, it is possible to use legislation to raise the minimum requirements concerning energy efficiency and to shift the expected standard to this new higher level.

**Success factors for the design of culture change campaigns**

The national culture/society needs to be ready to have the debate. This can be helped in the following ways:
The establishment of a taskforce signals government commitment to addressing the issue, and typically raises the sector’s awareness through the consultation process.

Public responses to high profile incidents can also signal readiness. For example, the anti-family violence campaign was coincidentally launched at a time when public dialogue about the nature, scale and prevalence of the issues had been heightened by a series of high profile child abuse cases leading to public marches and expression of concern. As a result public receptivity to the campaign’s messages was high.

Proactive investment in the messengers is necessary. Spokespeople on the ground need to be capable of contributing a consistent message once the campaign is underway. Investment can help to build the understanding of the media so that they recognise the campaign and report the relevant news in a way that is consistent and sympathetic to the wider campaign. This is particularly important if media reporting of the issues is known to be poor, inaccurate or uses language or statistics that reinforce common myths. For example:

- Research for the seatbelt campaign found that young males believed it was better not to wear a seatbelt because it increased the chances of survival by being thrown clear of the car during an impact. Media reporting of crashes in which occupants were described as being ‘thrown clear’ of the vehicle may have unwittingly reinforced this view.

- The seriousness or prevalence of family violence was not reflected accurately in media reports, and myths about family violence were often unintentionally endorsed. This was a result of the limited topic knowledge reporters held, and a shortage of quality spokespeople who were able to comment accurately on family violence.

It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the target groups and the existing culture. For culture change campaigns to be successful the reasons why the current culture and behaviours exist and the barriers/obstacles to change must be clear. Cultural values can have a strong influence on behaviours and attitudes which may not always be rational and might be difficult to overcome. Therefore, campaigns need to be informed by an appreciation of how existing cultural attitudes and values are contributing to undesirable behaviour and how other cultural values and norms can be leveraged to counter or reframe perceptions and responses to an issue.

Sequencing and layering the campaign activities helps to reinforce and embed messages within the community, for example:

- Change and improvement in any domain rarely occurs in a consistent progressive fashion, but ebbs and flows. Seatbelt compliance was variable, tending to rise when advertising and enforcement activities were underway, but dropping when these ceased. However, over time the overall level of compliance increased.
• Sequencing by preparing ground for the campaign and timing activities to coincide with actions of other stakeholders will help ensure receptivity to messages. In reducing family violence educating the media and building the capacity of community groups was essential to ensure a consistent message was presented, and that services were available to those who sought support as a result of the campaign.

• NZTA and Police established a road safety calendar to co-ordinate campaign and enforcement activities so that the message was seen to be driven by the community as a whole.

• It is also important to consider the sequencing of a culture change campaign in terms of other activities such as legislative or regulatory reform, economic drivers and education initiatives. For example, changes to workplace health and safety compliance requirements may reduce the pressure on employers and lead to shifts in certain attitudes and behaviours. Campaign messages need to be attuned to the nature of such shifts and designed to reinforce those that are desirable.

Investing in on-going research and evaluation is necessary to understand the issues and inform the campaign design as well as to learn from the effects of the campaign. Investment in monitoring, which is based on real world outcomes, is crucial. For example:

• In the case of safety belts, being able to understand, at a regional level, where problems still existed enabled a shift in focus (and associated savings) from a national campaign to a regionally-targeted approach which focused on laggards and late adopters.
Implications for a Workplace Health and Safety Culture Change Campaign

The findings from the review of the specific national culture change campaigns can be applied to the context of the problem definition for workplace health and safety, and the wider policy framework developed earlier. In this way, a number of implications for a national culture change campaign on workplace health and safety can be identified. These implications are highlighted in the following headings.

There is a need to clearly describe what good and poor workplace health and safety ‘looks like’

If workplace health and safety practices are going to be improved, we need to understand what good practices are and how they should look – what the desired behaviour is must be clearly outlined. From there, the problematic practices, attitudes and behaviours that constitute unsafe practice in the workplace and elsewhere, must be identified. Fatalities at work are important, but they are a symptom of wider behaviours and attitudes towards risk. A formative piece of research is required to fully understand the difference between the poor practice that exist now, and the good workplace health and safety practices the need to be achieved. This research would provide a direction for the culture change campaign and would help to outline the extent of the change that is necessary.

Submissions to the Taskforce suggest that overall public awareness of the scope and seriousness of unsafe workplace attitudes and behaviours is also low. If New Zealander’s attitudes and behaviours are going to shift, the range of problematic attitudes need to be understood and recognisable to all those targeted by the culture change campaign.

Invest in the strategic design of an overall programme to shift workplace health and safety outcomes

There are (at least) three important dimensions to the design of the overall programme to improve workplace health and safety that directly influence the approach to any culture change campaign:

- Sequence and order to have greatest impact – eg culture change campaign to lead the debate and create the environment for lifting regulatory standards (similar to the approach to energy efficiency) or culture change campaign to help address the laggards who are not complying with the regulation in place (similar to the approach to safety belts).
- Aligning incentives and supporting the desired behaviour – eg tackling any barriers and ensuring the wider economic context is consistent with actions being encouraged.
Ensuring the appropriate roles and responsibilities on the key players – owners, employers, managers, employees, subcontractors – and coordinating this with the relevant messages to change culture and behaviour.

**Work with media and advocates to change the terms of the debate**

It is likely public debate will need to be primed to lift awareness and develop an understanding of the issues around workplace health and safety, as an early stage of any campaign. This may involve media advocacy activities such as those used by the anti-family violence campaign, ie identifying a wider group of spokespeople and investing in them at an early stage in the process, so that they reinforce the messaging and approach. This would likely include working with the media to change the way workplace health and safety is reported. A successful campaign may also increase the demand for expert advice and support to address workplace health and safety issues. Considering how the campaign can support capability and capacity to respond to any increase in demand, in association with other interrelated interventions is also important.

**Coordinate and provide focus to wider community of action**

A need to coordinate with and draw upon the networks of community, industry and workplace health and safety – so that the national culture change campaign is supported by local action and to give that local action greater impact and purpose. For example, there is a road safety calendar that is used to coordinate media/marketing campaigns, the focus and intensity of enforcement and community level activities. Local level resources will also far outweigh the resources available to a campaign and if actively supported and leveraged, are able to continue to deliver and reinforce campaign messages after key high profile campaign activities (eg television advertising) have formally ceased.

**Give people positive reasons to change**

There is a need to create positive motivations to focus on health and safety in the workplace, rather than presenting as (burdensome) compliance. A campaign must work from where people are currently in their views and behaviours, and address the choices and decisions which need to change – it is not simply about making people feel bad about their actions, and should not be perceived as telling them what to do. Using messages that focus on the possibility of positive change as opposed to using shock value to highlight the consequences of non compliance may assist this. The authenticity of the message and the ‘voices’ presenting them (ie using true stories told by real people who have engaged in activities that constitute poor practice and then made improvements) can add credibility and reinforce that positive change is possible.
Make good health and safety practice an attractive investment for businesses

A positive business case needs to be developed for good health and safety, breaking the perception that there is a trade-off between health and safety and productivity and profit. This may require changing the incentives around health and safety – including the costs associated with good practice and the penalties attached to poor practice. The level of emphasis given to this within a campaign will need to be determined by the level of change in attitudes and behaviour that can be achieved through other interventions (such as legislative and regulatory reforms, economic initiatives and knowledge systems development).

Actively monitor and evaluate progress to inform the development of the programme and the culture change campaign

Evaluation and monitoring must be built into the culture change campaign upfront. This will allow refinement and development of the culture change campaign over time, which accounts for the public’s response to the culture change material, the effectiveness of the supporting activities, and the campaign’s impact on underlying outcomes such as a reduction in “near misses”.

Next Steps

Building on these implications, we can draw a number of tentative conclusions. These conclusions help to outline the likely next steps needed to develop the culture change campaign components of a wider programme to lift workplace health and safety performance.

Our review suggests that a national workplace health and safety culture change campaign would need sustained investment for at least 4 to 5 years, and a significant budget. Such a campaign would have an important role within a wider programme to improve workplace health and safety. In particular, it could help to coordinate and draw together wider system changes (eg regulation, enforcement, incentives, education, etc), and would help to provide a focus for action by other parties (eg industry and community groups, industry leaders) working in partnership with government.

The new stand-alone workplace health and safety agency would have an important leadership role for the overall programme to lift workplace health and safety performance. The workplace health and safety agency will also need to lead the culture change campaign as an integral part within this wider programme.

Reflecting the experience with previous national culture change campaigns, culture change campaigns can provide an important focus that can draw together the different strands of the programme in a visible and tangible way. As a result, a strong culture change campaign has the potential to result in the programme to improve workplace health and safety being more effective than the sum of its parts.

There are also a number of common success factors across the culture campaigns that have been reviewed. These success factors can be applied to the particular challenges facing New Zealand on workplace health and safety to draw the following tentative conclusions:

- The New Zealand public need to get to the point where they recognise the specific health and safety issues in the workplace, and where they can engage with messages and debate to change culture as part of the wider programme to address these issues. For example, a number of high profile incidents created a groundswell of opinion that attitudes to family violence needed to change. While the Pike River tragedy and the subsequent Royal Commission have raised the awareness of workplace health and safety, further targeted engagement will be required to shift the public to this point.

- The workplace health and safety agency will need a deep understanding of current workplace health and safety culture, and the different potential target groups for any culture change campaign. The evidence base on where people start from, why they make the choices they do and the barriers that they face will be critical to designing a campaign that resonates with and is relevant to the audience.

- There is a need to invest in the messengers and spokespeople, before the full campaign gets underway. This will help to change the terms of debate and then reinforce the
messages in the campaign. This would include working with the media to change the way they report on workplace health and safety incidents and comment on proposed changes. It would also require working with industry, sector and community groups (and staff within the workplace health and safety agency) to ensure there are sufficient spokespeople who are able to sustain and progress the public debate.

- The workplace health and safety agency will need to take a leadership role for the overall programme to improve workplace health and safety, and for the coordination and the positioning of the culture change campaign within this programme. This would include implemented a deliberate and consistent approach to achieving change and ensuring the different elements of the programme are mutually-reinforcing.

- The regulatory and economic settings need to be consistent with the desired behaviour change – so that there is a positive business case for changing the particular culture or behaviour, and to remove the main barriers to the culture change campaign. For example, in submissions there was a perception of a trade-off between workplace health and safety and productivity and profitability.

- Evaluation and monitoring should be an integral component of the culture change campaign, and the wider programme to improve workplace health and safety performance. All three campaigns evolved and developed over life, reflecting an iterative process that was informed by feedback on the earlier phases of the campaign and the growing evidence base. For workplace health and safety, this may mean an initial national campaign with a wide audience and a broad message, followed by subsequent phases with a greater focus on particular industries and / or target groups and / or specific behaviours or attitudes.
Annex One: National culture change campaign on safety belt use

Description of the culture change campaign

In 1995, the annual road toll in New Zealand had reached 585. As part of the National Road Safety Plan, the ambitious target was set to reduce this to no more than 420 deaths per year by 2001. Three issues were responsible for the majority of death and injury in New Zealand road crashes – drink driving, excessive speed and a failure to use safety belts.

In 1995, a coordinated national road safety campaign was introduced – the Supplementary Road Safety Package (SRSP). In the first year, safety belt use was not included as a priority due to lack of funding. However, from 1996 additional resource was allocated so that restraint use could be targeted.

In 1990, the level of restraint use nationally was 88% for adults in the front seat, and only 38% for adults in the back seat. Over the early 1990s, this declined to 86% for front seat use, and while there was a slight increase to 45% for back seat use, this was still less than half (in 1995).

The national advertising campaign was led by the then-Land Transport Safety Authority (LTSA; now New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA)), with involvement from the New Zealand Police. The Ministry of Transport is involved in setting the overarching strategy and priorities, but the development of road safety campaigns is the responsibility of NZTA. Road safety coordinators in territorial authorities also often contributed to enforcing the safety belt message, though they were not directly involved in the national campaign.

ACC played a small role in the safety belt campaign through their interest in workplace health and safety – they campaigned to have the cab of a commercial vehicle defined as a workplace, and ran a very small but targeted campaign to increase safety belt use in this setting (print only).

Problem definition for the culture change campaign

When the national campaign targeting restraint use was introduced in 1996, it was aimed broadly. While there was no specific target group in the original campaign, it was acknowledged that older drivers often did not wear safety belts simply because they never had, and there was a younger cohort that did not wear them, often compounded with drink-driving. However, this did not influence the style of advertising particularly.

While the ultimate aim of this campaign was to reduce road fatalities and serious injury, there were specific targets for safety belt use that form the best direct indicator of success for this
campaign. These were revised upwards each year – the targets in the first year were 95% for adults in the front seat, 81% for adults in the back seat and 91% for children under 15 years.

When the national campaign began 86% of adults in the front seat and 45% of adults in the back seat were wearing safety belts. For children 0-14 years, the figure was 77%.

Once safety belt use reached 95% nationally, the campaign became more targeted. NZTA research showed that non-use of safety belts was often a deliberate decision (as opposed to forgetting), and that those groups who needed targeting were male, from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and from provincial areas. The use of safety belts in the back seat was also lower (and continues to be lower) than in the front seat. At this point the national television campaign was discontinued, and the focus became more regional and targeted to different messages (eg always wear your safety belt, even on short journeys) and audiences.

Figure 7: Bumper sticker – back seat targeting

Figure 8: Billboard advertising 2009 – short journeys targeting

Implementation methodology

The national campaign to increase restraint use was part of a wider road safety package, based on a programme run in Victoria, Australia which used realistic images of road crash consequences. The Supplementary Road Safety Package (SRSP) was introduced in 1995 and received $50 million funding over the first four years to support a mass media campaign in
conjunction with targeted enforcement - $28 million of this was allocated to advertising. The package initially focused solely on drink driving and speed as causes of road crashes, but in 1996 an additional $1.24 million was added to the funding in order to target restraint use.

**Campaign components**

Preceding the coordinated national campaign, road safety advertising was sporadic. However, it did tend to concentrate on safety belt use to positive effect, although the increased use was generally short lived.

The activity associated with the national safety belt campaign was coordinated through the road safety calendar, which continues to be used for campaigns. This calendar sets out for the year the time that different issues will be prioritised by the police in terms of enforcement and enables media campaigns and other activities to be timed to best effect.

**National media campaign**

The safety belt campaign was strongly focused on national television advertising which evolved over the years, but used a combination of shock (graphic images of road crashes) and other information about consequences (including images of police informing families of deaths, and a real-life interview with a crash survivor). Given the nature of the subject, there was no emphasis on informing to public of how to undertake the activity, though at different points in the campaign the ease of using a safety belt, versus the scale of the consequences of not, was emphasised.
The television campaign was supported by the use of other traditional media including cinema, billboards, bus/truck backs, radio and magazine/print. Targeted placement of messages, such as on petrol pumps, reiterated the message further. All national media was jointly branded with both the New Zealand Police and LTSA/LTNZ/NZTA (and in some cases New Zealand Government).
Enforcement

The media campaign was supported by targeted enforcement of safety belt use by the New Zealand Police. The NZTA provides the Police with their road policing budget, and as such are able to influence priorities in this area. Information about this funding is explained in the section on Funding on page 40.

Local promotion

While the advertising campaign was designed to change safety belt wearing behaviour, in combination with enforcement, there was also a concerted effort to empower communities and build community capacity.

At a local level, road safety coordinators were involved in reinforcing the restraint message. Road safety coordinators work for local territorial authorities and used to be partially funded by the LTSA. While they are free to convey messages in the way they see fit, the LTSA strongly supported the use of the national safety belt campaign in order to try and reinforce the national message. This was previously supported by the Community Road Safety Programme (CRSP), which provided resources for community education activities. Through the CRSP website, organisations were able to access advertising guidelines, and advice regarding how best to align local and national advertising. It is important to note that because local activity was self-directed, the success or otherwise of local initiatives, and the degree to which it supported the national message, was variable.

Local activities often included community events, demonstrations, use of local media and distribution of promotional material (eg fridge magnets, pens).
Delivering the message

The LTSA made a deliberate decision (and continue to take this approach) not to use ‘heroes’ to deliver road safety messages, including for safety belts. While they can vet someone’s background, they cannot control future events – if one of their spokespeople were to be caught doing the very activity they were advocating against (or in the case of safety belts, not doing the thing they were advocating for), it would be detrimental to any campaigns.

Campaign sequencing - Research and monitoring

The campaign was informed by a very strong programme of research and monitoring. NZTA has a specific research budget associated with their advertising budget, which can be used only for research (this changes each year, and is not for any specific campaign). A qualitative approach is most often used to inform advertising, usually using in-depth interviews with a cross-section of the target population. This ensures that the message is conveyed in the best possible way, to the most appropriate audience.

The cycle for each phase of the campaign was approximately 18 months – around 9 months to produce each television advertisement and 9 months to observe any behaviour change. In each cycle research informed the future direction of the campaign, in conjunction with extensive and targeted monitoring. There were six different television and cinema phases during the campaign, following roughly this 18 month cycle of research and development and supported by other media. From an advertising perspective, key measurements that tracked the success of the campaign included: recall of advertising, relevance to target audience, key message takeout, likeability and so on. These sorts of measures were tracked via an independent research company continually, and enabled ongoing assessment of the effectiveness of the campaign. One excellent example of this was the close monitoring of the success of one television advertisement, “Unexpected Visitor”, which showed police informing a family about an accident. In this case, monitoring showed that it was failing to have the impact desired, so the ad was quickly substituted with one from the Victorian campaign (upon which the SRSP was modelled).

The NZTA has a regular monitoring programme in place for safety belt use. Three times a year they run observational surveys – each time for a different type of use: front seat, back seat adults and children. This monitoring represents a significant investment, but was vital for informing the campaign. It is done to a level where regional differences can be identified, which allowed the safety belt campaign to target those regions where use was lowest – in 2003 the survey programme was expanded from 114 to 274 sites, to enable targeting to the territorial authority level where possible. This continues to be the case and road safety coordinators can apply for funding in their region on the basis of poor results from these surveys.

The NZTA also runs an annual Public Attitudes Survey, which provides high-level results that can help inform advertising. As a specific example, the data used to inform their 2004 safety belt advertising brief showed that 95% of people thought safety belts were effective for reducing
the road told, just over half (56%) thought the risk of getting caught was small, and a third thought the penalties were not severe (a drop from 48% in 1996). Males believed more strongly than females that people caught not wearing a safety belt are just unlucky (38% v 28%).

Legislation

When safety belt use was targeted for change in New Zealand, there was a well established legislative framework in place that ensured that the right equipment and requirements for use were in place to support restraint use.

Equipment

A brief history of traffic legislation introduced since 1965 shows that from 1965, all new cars, station wagons and light trucks were required to be fitted with safety belts. In 1975, these requirements were extended to motor vehicles registered on or after 1 January 1955.

While not a legislative issue, the increasing use of safety belt reminders in cars is also likely to support the use of restraints (eg a warning alarm sounds if safety belts are not engaged in seats where significant weight is detected).

Use

In 1972, it became compulsory for most drivers and front seat passengers 15 and over to wear safety belts (in the vehicles in which they were required) – in 1979 the age was lowered to 8 years. The current fine for not using a safety belt is $150 (increased from $75 in 1999), and drivers are liable for any passengers under 15 years not using safety belts or the required restraints.

Funding

When safety belts were included as the third priority area in the SRSP in 1996, funding was $1.24 million for the year. When the decision was made to discontinue the national television campaign in 2004, funding was reduced to $800,000 a year. While the television campaign was running this used up approximately 70% of the budget, with the remaining spent on other traditional media such as radio, outdoor and print.

Over the duration of the campaign, enforcement funding for targeting safety belt use rose from $4.15 million in the first year (1996/97) to $14.1 million in 2009/10. In the year immediately following, funding was cut to $7.4 million.

Yearly advertising and enforcement budgets are included in Table 3.
As stated above, road safety coordinators and their activities were not strictly part of the national campaign. However, they were strongly influenced by the LTSA’s direction. The LTSA, at that point, contributed 20% of the funding for these positions.

Outcomes

Offence notices

In the first year, 30,624 safety belt offence notices were issued. This peaked in 2003/04 at 88,934, and in the last year of the campaign 72,741 notices were issued. This does not particularly indicate that less people were wearing seat belts, and is more likely an artefact of increased prominence of the issue. Analysis shows that there was a correlation of 0.84 between enforcement funding and offence notices issued for the duration of the campaign, indicating a strong relationship between the two. This is to be expected, as funding directly relates to the number of hours Police can spend on an activity.

Safety belt use

Monitoring over the 14 years of the campaign suggests that it has achieved excellent results in terms of safety belt use. Table 3 shows that for the last five years of the campaign, front seat safety belt use was consistently at 95%. In the two years following, use has been maintained (96%), despite the enforcement budget being halved.

An analysis of the data in Table 3 shows that there was a correlation of 0.97 between enforcement funding and safety belt use for the years during which the campaign ran, showing a very strong relationship between the two. Considering only the years for which funding was maintained at the higher levels (until 2003/04), the correlation between advertising budget and safety belt use was 0.63 – not as strong as for the relationship between enforcement budget and use, but a notable relationship nonetheless.
### Table 3: Safety belt advertising and enforcement budgets and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Advertising budget ($m)</th>
<th>Enforcement budget ($m)</th>
<th>Safety belt offence notices issued</th>
<th>Safety belt use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adults front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>30,624</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>38,045</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>45,090</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>27,465</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>33,077</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>40,224</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>65,926</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>10.66</td>
<td>88,943</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>76,147</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>65,517</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>63,419</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>13.74</td>
<td>81,953</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>78,231</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>72,741</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>61,145</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58,289</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZTA and MOT

**Reducing road fatalities and serious injury**

Detailed evaluation of the SRSP was undertaken for the 1995-2000 period, and an econometric analysis estimated that between 285 and 516 lives were saved, and between 1,700 and 2000 serious injuries were prevented.\(^{15}\) No definite conclusions about the individual contributions of enforcement and advertising could be made due to the interaction between the two activities. However, given that over the period there was very little change in enforcement, but a large increase in advertising activity, it is likely that the media campaigns made a large contribution to these savings.

---

Unfortunately, analyses only exist for the SRSP as a whole, so these results are not particularly useful in terms of determining the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the safety belt campaign alone in reducing road crash fatalities and serious injury. It does highlight, however, how difficult it can be to attribute cause to culture change campaigns, and in particular to specific components of them.

**Watching brief**

There are still around 30 people dying each year that would have been saved if they had been wearing safety belts. This means that although safety belt use is not a priority issue at the moment, it will remain a concern for the transport agencies.

**Success factors**

The strategy behind the national road safety campaign has changed very little since it was first introduced in 1995. It was based on sound evidence and continues to prove its effectiveness. The key success factors identified were the use of enforcement, extensive research and monitoring, and the coordination amongst stakeholders.

- **Enforcement**: Representatives from the NZTA and MoT all agreed that the level of enforcement was key to achieving the outcomes realised from the safety belt campaign and most likely the most important part of the culture change campaign, and this is confirmed by the simple correlational analysis above (0.97). When the Police were targeting safety belt use, behaviour change was observed. The advertising campaign supported this and also attempted to stop compliance levels from dropping so dramatically during periods when targeted enforcement was not occurring.

- **Evidence based approach**: A 2006 review of the National Road Safety Advertising Programme\(^\text{16}\) concluded that:

  > The success of the advertising programme within the STSP should largely be attributed to its culture of evidence based decision-making and sound research and analysis. (p.6)

There was agreement amongst stakeholders we spoke with that the significant investment in research and comprehensive monitoring was a key success factor of the campaign. The programme was guided by an intervention logic identifying output measures (advertising and offence notices), intermediate outcomes (safety belt wearing, audience recall and relevance, attitudes to road safety) and overall outcomes (road deaths and injuries). Mixed methods were used to determine the effectiveness of the campaign and future direction including quantitative surveys of safety belt use and attitudes, scene of accident data, economic modelling and in-depth qualitative interviews. All of these things enabled the campaign to target the right audience, in the right way.

---

• **Coordination:** The coordination of the enforcement, research and advertising elements of the SRSP has been held up as one of the best examples of alignment within the State Sector in New Zealand.\(^{17}\)

In addition to coordination in terms of the implementing the national campaign, the coordination of local-level initiatives was an excellent example of the leverage that can be achieved to support a national culture change campaign. The road safety calendar is an excellent example of a tool to enable alignment between agencies.

**Implications for workplace health and safety**

There are a number of lessons that can be applied to the workplace health and safety area.

• **Personal responsibility message:** The focus of the safety belt campaign was very much on people taking personal responsibility for restraint use, and this approach is appropriate in the workplace health and safety setting as well (possibly in conjunction with other kinds of messages around social responsibility and so on).

• **Plan a wider campaign:** While the safety belt campaign is complete in its own right, it is a very narrow, targeted behaviour. It is more appropriate to think of a wider workplace health and safety culture change campaign at the same level as the road safety campaign in its entirety – which included drink driving, speed, intersections, fatigue, vehicle safety, distraction and so on. While the overarching aim was to reduce road fatalities and serious injury, and to encourage generally safer road use behaviours, each individual campaign targeted a priority issue. As in workplace health and safety, achieving these overall outcomes (reduced fatalities and injuries) will be the result of a shift in many behaviours.

• **Invest in research and monitoring:** The cost of comprehensive research and monitoring can be significant. To ensure that the investment in advertising (and in this case, enforcement) is realised, campaigns need to be informed by in-depth research in the market. This means that the message can be delivered to the right audience, in the right way. Comprehensive monitoring needs to be included part of the review cycle, not only in order to observe the success or otherwise of the campaign in changing behaviours and achieving outcomes, but also in order to maintain relevance and accurate targeting of the campaign.

• **Coordinate efforts:** Make an effort to coordinate the activities of all agencies/groups, even those who may not strictly be involved in the campaign, but can enforce the messages in some ways to achieve maximum impact.

• **Ensure that the legislation supports the culture change campaign:** In the case of safety belts, the legislation supporting people to undertake the behaviours required of them had been in place for a long time before the national campaign began. This ensured that

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
the right equipment was available (safety belts legally required in the front and back), and that the use of these could be enforced.

- **Enforce**: Targeted enforcement proved extremely effective in changing safety belt use behaviour. While this was very straightforward in the case of safety belts, this is not the case for workplace health and safety. There will be a very wide range of behaviours that need to change, with a much smaller scope for enforcement (both in terms of resource and ability to be there when behaviours are occurring).
Annex Two: National culture change campaign on anti-family violence.

Description of the culture change campaign

Family violence is a significant social issue in New Zealand. Recent statistics indicate that 58% of all reported violent crime in New Zealand is family violence and on average, 14 women, 7 men and 8 children are killed by a member of their family every year. In 2005, in response to increasing public concern and awareness of family violence a Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families was established to lead and co-ordinate interagency action to address family violence, including abuse and neglect of children and older persons. A series of high profile incidents (child abuse cases such as Nia Glassie’s death in 2007) also acted as a catalyst for public debate about family violence issues.

The anti family violence campaign (which came to be known as the “It’s not Ok” campaign) was initiated by the Taskforce (in 2006) as part of a national strategy to prevent family violence. The Campaign was led by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in association with the Families Commission, and a range of other agencies including the Accident Compensation Corporation, Ministry of Health and the New Zealand Police. A Māori Reference Group and Pacific Advisory Group were also established to provide strategic advice to the campaign team (via the Taskforce) about how the campaign could impact on Māori and Pacific peoples in New Zealand.

Problem definition for the culture change campaign

The campaign design was informed by formative research which revealed that New Zealanders’ understandings of family violence were confined to a narrow perception of family violence as being largely about domestic violence and partner abuse. As a result, New Zealanders tended to minimise, accept or even justify other forms of family violence. Input from key stakeholder groups involved in the campaign’s design also identified that media reporting of family violence issues did not reflect seriousness or prevalence of family violence. New stories often unintentionally endorsed myths about family violence. This was due to reporters having limited knowledge of the topic and a general lack of quality spokespeople able to comment on family violence. This indicated there was a clear need to raise public awareness of what constitutes family violence and to create a broader sense of social responsibility for identifying and ending family violence.

---

18 Recent statistics from the campaign site (http://www.areyouok.org.nz/statistics.php). Police are called family violence situations every day - one every 6 minutes - but estimate that only 20% of incidents ever come to their attention. These statistics are higher than they were at the time of the campaign development and launch, and are believed to be the result of increased awareness and reporting of family violence incidents to Police.

19 Community organisations working to prevent family violence rarely engaged with the media out of fear, lack of skills and ignorance of the contribution they could make.
Consequently, the campaign was designed to educate all New Zealanders about the range of attitudes and behaviour that constitute family violence, to showcase positive examples of changes in attitudes and behaviour and to educate the public about ‘help giving’ behaviour - ie strategies anyone could use to support perpetrators and victims of family violence. To achieve these objectives, the campaign was designed as a multilayered intervention that targeted the news media, the New Zealand public as a whole (as opposed to specific target populations) and community-level organisations (ie local community services, government, businesses and sports organisations). In this respect, the campaign can be seen as departing from usual social marketing practices of identifying a specific priority population to target. However, from the outset the campaign was conceived as a social change movement aimed at raising public awareness of the scope and depth of family violence, and creating a social context in which people could feel safe talking about family violence and seeking help to prevent and address it.

Implementation methodology

A four year campaign was designed and launched in 2007. The design of the campaign was directly informed by:

- **research examining the effectiveness of past public education campaigns**: Findings indicated that campaigns that were of short duration, low-intensity, and not supported by research into audience motivations, consistent funding or ongoing research and evaluating tended to have limited or only short term impact on changing attitudes and behaviours20.

- **consultation with expert stakeholder groups**: Stakeholders21 were selected for their expert knowledge of the impacts of family violence on different groups and demonstrated commitment to working with government and community agencies

- **The Te Rito Family Violence Prevention Strategy**: The strategy was developed by MSD in 2002 and provided a useful definition of family violence that helped to clarify the range of abuses that constitute family violence and needed to be highlighted by the campaign.

The campaign itself was comprised of five strands of activity:

- Media advocacy
- A mass media campaign
- A Community Action Fund
- Partnerships with community agencies, sports, business and government organisations
- Research and evaluation


21 The stakeholder groups included National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges, Relationship Services, the National Network of Stopping Violence Services and Jigsaw Family Services
Media advocacy

The media were viewed as a target audience and a tool to promote change, ie a key sector who could highlight the scope and seriousness of family violence and support change by influencing the quality and quantity of family violence news stories across the print and broadcast media. Media advocacy activities began one year prior to launch of the mass media campaign and included:

- Designing a family violence seminar for reporters and accredited journalism schools. The 90 minute seminar provided basic information on family violence (definition of what family violence encompasses, who is affected, current statistics, relevant laws and the dynamics of abusive relationships). The seminar alerted reporters to common myths and stereotypes and illustrated best practice for reporting family violence incidents, using New Zealand examples of good and bad stories. Guidelines for Reporters were also developed and made available on the Campaign’s website.

- Providing media training workshops for local community spokespeople who did not normally have contact with the media. Workshops were free and offered around the country. They provided step by step practical information on the importance of being part of news stories and how to go about it in a safe way. The workshop demystified the news media and showed participants how to get into the news on their own terms so they would be well positioned to interact effectively with media once public debate around family violence was triggered through the mass media campaign. Participants were also offered media support post-workshop, eg to assist them in writing media releases, talking over key messages prior to an interview and support for media strategies.

- Insight: those delivering the messages are those who have credibility and ‘reach’ either at a national or community level or both.

The mass media campaign

The mass media element of the campaign involved three phases of television advertising with supporting information available via print, radio and other resources (e.g. 0800 Family Violence information line and campaign website).

The mass media elements of the campaign took a consistently positive approach by aiming to inspire change. The advertisements avoided the use of shock tactics or information that could blame, shame and demonise people, in the belief that advertisements depicting extreme family violence would allow people to distance themselves from the issues. Instead, the mass media strand was designed to challenge social norms associated with family violence (i.e. as a secret or private topic) by exposing the personal and family costs of family violence and the possibility and benefits of changing it.
The focus of the television advertisements differed for each phase and considerable emphasis was placed on ensuring that key messages were authentic and delivered by a mix of individuals that would allow all New Zealanders to identify someone they could relate to; for example:

- **Phase one advertisements** featured ordinary New Zealanders and local celebrities describing different forms of violence that are not ok in order to raise public awareness of the scope of attitudes/behaviours that constitute family violence.
- **Phase two advertisements** featured real individuals presenting true stories of their personal experience of family violence (either as a perpetrator or concerned bystander), and focusing on how they had changed their behaviour for the better.
- **Phase three advertisements** promoted ‘help giving behaviour’ to reinforce idea that it is ok to help prevent family violence. These advertisements demonstrated actual help giving behaviour by showing ordinary New Zealanders coming forward to assist perpetrators and victims of family violence.

**Figure 11: It’s not OK – samples of the advertising campaign**
The advertisements also promoted positive attitudinal and behavioural change by:

- Making a critical distinction between stigmatising perpetrators and stigmatising violent behaviour. This is consistent with the approach of not ‘demonising’ perpetrators of violence. The male perpetrators were characterised as men with unacceptable behaviour, rather than unacceptable men.

- Using real life stories about change. These authentic stories presented by actual perpetrators and a bystander were key in enabling viewers to see that genuine social change is possible.

- Use of a simple but sophisticated tagline (‘It’s not ok... but it is ok to ask for help’). The tagline was well pitched to resonate and appeal to New Zealanders cultural values, in so far as it raised a sensitive topic using informal, pragmatic, laconic, understated language. The simplicity of the tagline also gave it wide applicability to describe a variety of family violence situations. Most importantly, the tagline acted as a ‘tool’ for change, by providing a practical opening line or ‘conversation starter’ individuals and communities could use to broach family violence issues in real life situations.

Figure 12: It’s not OK ... It is OK to ask for help

The Community Action Fund

The community agency fund was established to enable community ownership and commitment to the prevention of family violence to be bolstered and spread into ‘everyday places’ (ie such as supermarkets, sports clubs, schools, cafés, and to showcase campaign messages on buses, billboards etc). The value of the fund is that it enables existing community infrastructure, networks, expertise and resources to be leveraged to support and sustain the campaign messages within a variety of community violence prevention activities long term. Between 2007-2012 the fund was used to support 147 projects.
Funding applications are reviewed and approved by a MSD panel. Applications are assessed on level of community need (and specific local family-violence related issues that will be addressed through the project), innovation in approaches proposed, and the use of a group approach (ie ability to engage sports groups, businesses to leverage sustainable positive change rather key individuals). Over the four year campaign a total of approximately $5,525,000 was allocated. The fund continues to operate and is funded through MSD baseline (at approximately $240,000 pa).

**Partnerships with community agencies, sports, business and government organisations**

The campaign actively focused on establishing partnerships with sectors and organisations in and beyond the family violence sector in order to expand the influence and reach of family violence prevention messages. Partnership building was facilitated through the use of the community action fund (described above) and a ‘Many Voices’ strategy which involved identifying specific groups that could be approached and supported to take action to prevent family violence. Potential partnerships were identified by assessing a group or sector’s audience reach, sustainability, the ability to involve others (based on community linkages), fit with existing Campaign activities and potential leverage, innovation, the cost to the Campaign, the credibility of the individuals involved and their ability to ‘get stuff done’.

The campaign team developed a range of documentation and a model for community action outlining specific roles and actions that could be undertaken by identified groups and sectors. The documentation was available on the campaign’s website and designed to be used by community spokespeople or campaign champions to engage and work with local organisations. A copy of the coordinated community action wheel is provided in Annex Four.

**Research and evaluation**

Research and evaluation was recognised as being a core strand of the campaign reflected in the funding allocated to the programme. Research and evaluation was used to inform the design and focus of campaign activities and to monitor their impact and effectiveness. The main evaluation/research activities undertaken throughout the campaign can be summarised as follows:

- **Formative research** to inform the design of the campaign. Two projects exploring New Zealander’s attitudes and understandings about intimate partner and child abuse. Both reports also reviewed literature relating to the effectiveness of previous social marketing campaigns aimed at addressing these issues.

- **Monitoring Surveys.** Three surveys were undertaken between December 2007 and September 2008 to monitor public recall and retention of the campaign’s key messages.

- **Campaign impact research reports.** A variety of research reports were undertaken to explore different aspects of the campaign approach and impact. These included:
A community impact study, exploring changes in family violence attitudes and behaviours in four New Zealand communities.

A research report documenting the campaign approach and lessons learned from its implementation.

Formative research exploring community level confidence, willingness and capacity to provide practical support to reduce/prevent family violence. This research was used to inform the subsequent ‘help giving’ phase of the campaign.

A case study exploring the impacts of presentations given to schools by a reformed perpetrator (Vic Tamati).

A research report documenting the media advocacy activities employed and their impact.

**Campaign sequencing**

The implementation of the campaign activities was sequenced broadly as follows:

- Formative research to design overall focus of the campaign.
- Media advocacy and design of mass media content – i.e. three phases of television advertising (phase 1: raising public awareness of family violence; phase 2: stories of positive change; phase 3: help seeking and help giving behaviours).
- Active partnership development and implementation of the mass media campaigns.
- Ongoing development and administration of the community action fund and community partnership model.
- Ongoing research and evaluation.
Total campaign funding

The campaign cost a total of $13.7 million over four years, with funding apportioned as noted below in Table 4.

Table 4: Funding for the anti-family violence campaign 2006-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Element</th>
<th>Year 1 2006/07</th>
<th>Year 2 2007/08</th>
<th>Year 3 2008/09</th>
<th>Year 4 2009/10</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Action (43%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund &amp; partnerships</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
<td>$1,660,000</td>
<td>$1,705,000</td>
<td>$1,360,000</td>
<td>$5,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Advocacy</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$145,000</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$445,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$1,805,000</td>
<td>$1,855,000</td>
<td>$1,410,000</td>
<td>$5,970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications (37%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Media</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$2,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Material</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$186,000</td>
<td>$1,386,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Activity</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$1,600,000</td>
<td>$1,750,000</td>
<td>$886,000</td>
<td>$5,136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Evaluation (11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formative research, benchmarking, media tracking &amp; monitoring</td>
<td>$365,000</td>
<td>$420,000</td>
<td>$420,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$365,000</td>
<td>$420,000</td>
<td>$420,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination (9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff etc costs</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$320,000</td>
<td>$320,000</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$1,190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$320,000</td>
<td>$320,000</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$1,190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,465,000</td>
<td>$4,145,000</td>
<td>$4,345,000</td>
<td>$2,841,000</td>
<td>$13,796,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note that this budget includes funding contributed by the Families Commission of $300,000 in year 1, $1 million in year 2 and $1 million in year 3 (this was used to fund the mass media campaign activities described above). MSD funding of $500,000 in year 4 was also used for mass media. Community Action Fund and Partnerships funding was combined as the projects were developed collectively. The campaign continues to be funded through MSD baselines at approximately $240,000 per annum which allows for approximately 3.5 weeks of television advertising per year (conducted prior and during the Christmas holiday period) and approximately four FTE are required to sustain programme activities.

Outcomes

The ‘It’s not OK campaign’ sought to contribute to a reduction in the incidence of family violence by raising public awareness and understanding of family violence as an serious issue, reducing tolerance of family violence and increasing people’s propensity to act on family violence. However it was widely recognised that family violence is a complex intergenerational issue and its incidence is generally underreported. The campaign did not set specific targets in terms of a reduction in key family violence indicators (e.g. reported incidents of family violence, notifications to Child, Youth and Family, reported fatalities due to family violence, prosecutions for family violence), though it was expected that if successful, the campaign should lead to an increase in some indicators (e.g. reported incidents, prosecutions and notifications) over the short term, which would stabilise, then drop as efforts to address family violence began to have an impact on offending behaviour.

Short term impacts of the campaign

The impact of the campaign’s messages (as conveyed through television advertising) on public awareness, understanding and propensity to take action were monitored through a series of tracking surveys\(^\text{22}\). Overall, recall of a message from at least one of the television advertisement increased from 87% to 95% between December 2007 and September 2008.

The level of specific recall and uptake of key messages indicated by the surveys a year after television advertising began\(^\text{23}\) were as follows:

- 88% of those who had viewed the advertisements agreed the campaign created the expectation that changing a life without violence is possible. Agreement was higher amongst Māori, with 95% of Māori males and females agreeing with this statement.

\(^{22}\) The three tracking surveys were undertaken, the first, three months after phase one advertisements screened (in December 2007), the second six months later in April 2008 (by which time the second phase of advertisements had also screened) and the third a year later (i.e. in September 2008).

\(^{23}\) The first phase of television advertisements screened in September 2007, phase two advertisements screened in February 2008. A third phase of advertisements screened in September 2010 and encouraged people to reach out when they know someone who is living with violence (it is OK to help).
68% agreed that the campaign had helped them understand that they should not tolerate violence within families. Agreement was significantly higher amongst Pacific people – with 87% of Pacific males and 82% of Pacific females agreeing with this statement.

57% agreed advertisements had made them feel they could help influence someone to change their behaviour. Agreement was also significantly higher amongst Pacific people – with 76% of Pacific males and 71% of Pacific females agreeing with this statement.

22% reported they had taken at least one of the five actions to prevent or address family violence. The most common actions reported by those who recalled the advertisements were

- talking to family or friends about violence they were worried about (14%)
- obtain information about family violence (8%)
- contact some other organisation, professional or community leader to talk about violence they were worried about (5%).

A fourth tracking survey undertaken in 2010 showed that overall awareness of the campaign has dropped to 93% (from 95% in September 2008) but that

- 97% of people believe family violence is a serious problem and it’s not ok to ignore it.
- 90% believe a life without violence is possible (increase from 88% in previous surveys)
- 81% felt they could help to change the behaviour of a perpetrator (increase from 57% in previous surveys)
- 77% said the campaign had helped them understand what they could do to support those experiencing family violence
- 58% reported taking some kind of action to address or prevent family violence (eg talking to a friend they were worried about, obtaining information about the topic, contacting an organisation or professional to discuss concerns about family violence or taking part in community activities to prevent them). This was an increase from the 22% who reported undertaking at least one action in September 2008.

**Medium term impacts**

Changes in family violence indicators can not be directly attributed to the effectiveness of the ‘It’s not Ok’ campaign; however recent trends in some of these indicators are beginning to

---

24 A range of issues limit the availability of valid, reliable data to monitor trends in the occurrence of family violence. These include the fact that many data sets are not specifically designed to measure family violence (ie crime statistics, convictions and sentencing data, hospital discharge data) and that no one agency is responsible for defining and collating a consistent dataset of family violence indicators. The sensitivity and often shame associated with nature of family violence can lead to under reporting and changes in organisations’ policies and procedures over time result in changes in the type of information collected and analysed in existing data sets.
demonstrate predicted patterns. For example, although the total number of family violence offences and family violence assault offences continues to rise the rate of increase appears to be slowing. Police statistics indicate that family violence offences increased in 2007/08 fiscal year, by 28.1 per cent, by 13.1 per cent during 2008/09 and by 8.5 per cent in 2009/10. Likewise, reporting of family violence partner offences has increased. The New Zealand crime and safety survey data (NZCASS) showed that in 2006, 79% of victims did not contact police, but this dropped to 75% in 2009. Notifications to child youth and family also increased between 2004 and 2010 (from 40,000 to 125,000) and may reflect an increased awareness amongst family, friends and other agencies of child abuse.

Success factors

Research and evaluation findings and stakeholders involved in the campaign design and implementation identify the following factors as key to the success of the “It’s not OK” campaign.

1. A growing level of national receptiveness and readiness for change and action to address family violence. The establishment of the Taskforce signalled government commitment to addressing issues of family violence. A series of high profile incidents (ie child abuse cases such as Nia Glassie’s death which occurred the same year the mass media campaign was launched) also acted as a catalyst for greater public engagement in family violence issues.

2. A strong, existing community level infrastructure for providing support to those at risk or affected by family violence. The campaign team was able to partner with organisations (eg Women’s Refuge etc) that had extensive national networks and organisational support across the country. These networks and expertise supported the design and implementation of the campaign and provided information about attitudinal and behavioural at the grass roots level, which while largely anecdotal, was valuable because of the consistency of changes being reported across diverse geographical areas.

3. Viewing the campaign as a social change movement rather than mass media campaign so from the outset, the campaign was designed with a clear intention to support and mobilise a wide range of groups within local communities to generate support for action and change.

4. Use of a multilayered campaign structure comprising 5 strands of activity. The structure and sequencing of the campaign’s key activities worked to build the awareness and capacity of key groups (i.e. media, community spokespeople and

community level partnerships) that could be used to support, reinforce and embed the social change messages.

5 Establishment of a multi-disciplinary campaign team that included staff who had specific experience, political savvy and expertise in the areas of social change, media and family violence.

6 Professional courage and tolerance for risk. The approach taken by the campaign including using ‘real voices’ and people who had been perpetrators of family violence. Profiling such people involved multiple risks for the campaign and its partner agencies. For example, trusting that individuals would maintain their changed behaviour and not undermine credibility of the campaign. Some partner potential conflict/loss of support from partner agencies, who viewed profiling perpetrators as potentially showcasing/rewarding past behaviour.

7 The simplicity and sophistication of the mass media campaign. In particular the positive focus and authenticity of the television advertising and the tagline.

Implications for workplace health and safety

The anti family violence campaign provide valuable insights about how a culture change campaign can be used to build social awareness of an issue, challenge negative stereotypes and promote practical, positive change and actions at a community or individual level. Some of the approaches used could be usefully applied to the workplace health and safety context.

Raising awareness: Submissions to the Taskforce indicate that awareness of the scope and severity of unsafe workplace practices, attitudes and behaviours is low amongst the workplace health and safety sector and New Zealanders as a whole. If New Zealand’s workplace health and safety record is going to improve, the range of problematic attitudes and behaviours need to be understood and recognisable to all those targeted by the change campaign. Articulating and accepting the nature of the problem is a key first step in being able to work towards change. A culture change campaign can be used to raise public awareness, by clearly describing what poor WHS ‘looks like’ ie, the problematic practices, attitudes and behaviours that constitute unsafe practice in the workplace and elsewhere (ie fatalities at work are important, but they are a symptom of wider behaviours and attitudes to risk and their multiple impacts). The Its Not Ok campaign also highlights the need to consider raising awareness at multiple levels. If sector-level awareness is as low as it appears, then media advocacy activities to raise the media knowledge of the issues and their scope may be particularly valuable. Likewise, supporting a key sector spokespeople to become knowledgeable about the depth of the problems and to engage effectively with media will help reinforce awareness-raising messages promoted via television, radio, print and web-based sources.

Challenging and reshaping undesirable social-cultural norms: Taskforce submissions also indicate that WHS is widely perceived (ie by employees and employers alike) as a compliance
burden by that prevents workers from ‘getting on with the job’ and protects managers from accepting responsibility/liability for managing WHS outcomes. A culture change campaign could be used to challenge and reshape this social narrative in a positive way. The ‘It’s not Ok’ campaign suggests that messages designed encourage low tolerance for inappropriate social attitudes and behaviour are likely to be noticed and heard if they are:

- Authentic and credible (ie delivered by people who have personal experience of the issues and/or are well known).
- Emphasise the positive (ie by acknowledging the challenges and highlighting choices and decisions that are required to enable change, as opposed to seeking to shock or shame target groups into feeling uncomfortable about behaviours and their consequences).
- Clearly signal that change is possible (ie by acknowledging past negative practices and presenting new, changed attitudes and behaviour).

From a workplace health and safety perspective, a cultural change campaign may need to acknowledge the difficulties and tensions employers and employee perspectives experience when seeking to manage WHS, while demonstrating that change is possible. Staff from the Its not Ok campaign team highlighted the value of capturing ‘hidden or missing voices’ – ie ensuring that the campaign made careful use of ‘perpetrator’ voices (ie those who had engaged in activities that constituted poor practice and then made improvements) as well as ‘victims’ to capture attention of both groups. Although there are risks associated with such an approach, (ie perpetrators may reoffend and undermine credibility of the campaign messages) such an approach can be very powerful in conveying that change is possible and achievable.

**Supporting change at a localised level**: Submissions to the Taskforce also indicate that government, leaders, regulators, employers and employees need a clearer, practical understanding about ‘how’ and ‘what’ they need to do to better manage WHS. Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of these groups can be achieved in various ways (for example, reviewing regulatory incentives and enforcement options, integrating health and safety training into secondary and tertiary learning, developing clearer standards, guidelines and systems to promote wide access to this information). A culture change campaign can help to reinforce the intent and impact of other interventions aimed at shifting practices and attitudes at a sector, industry or workplace level. For example, by actively seeking to build industry, workplace and community capability and capacity to initiate and sustain attitudinal changes that address specific issues in these contexts. This may involve funding for local-level initiatives and resources that provide workplaces and industry bodies with a framework for thinking about workplace health and safety issues in their environment and the kinds of actions they can take to address these. The majority of the It’s Not Ok campaign funding was used for this purpose (ie Community Action Fund and the Many Voices strategy). However, it is critical that capacity building activities undertaken through the campaign at this level remained remain clearly linked to the campaign’s overarching messages and are informed by and integrated with the other interventions being implemented. This will likely necessitate considerable planning, information
exchange and co-ordination between the key stakeholders and agencies involved overseeing the change process.

Taking an evidence-informed approach: The issues contributing to NZ’s current workplace health and safety outcomes are complex and multi-faceted so a cultural change campaign will need to be part of an overarching package of interventions aimed at addressing the different drivers of concern. A multilayered culture change campaign can be designed to bring about desirable social cultural changes while also reinforcing attitudinal and behavioural shifts that occur as a result of other interventions. For example, it may be used to both raise awareness of the issue, prime key groups to act in response to greater awareness and to support and embed desirable shifts in the values and practices of target groups as they occur. However, to achieve this, such a campaign will need to underpinned by a solid and ongoing programme of research and evaluation that identifies relevant attitudes and behaviours that need to be challenged and monitors how these change over time and why.
Annex Three: National energy efficiency culture change strategy and campaign

Overall description of EECA’s approach to the culture change campaign

The goal of Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) is to maximise cost-effective energy savings and the associated co-benefits for all New Zealanders, and stimulate the uptake of both large and small-scale renewable energy. EECA does this by supporting and promoting energy efficiency, energy conservation, and the use of renewable sources of energy.

EECA has taken a strategic approach to developing and implementing a culture change campaign. The basis of EECA’s strategic approach is to develop and use brands as the platform to communicate complex messages around the value of being energy efficient. These brands are supported and further developed through each specific marketing activity. Two brands have been developed, one to target consumers and the other businesses. This was necessary because these two different groups have distinct needs and will be influenced in different ways. The strategic approach to the culture change campaign has achieved much greater value for money than the previous focus on delivering discrete behaviour change interventions that were not otherwise connected. EECA have adopted this tactic since 2008.

Problem definition for the culture change campaign

There are a number of challenges to be overcome in changing the behaviour of businesses so that they make more energy efficient decisions. Technology is currently available to make a significant difference to New Zealand’s’ energy use, however uptake of this technology is low. Changing behaviours so that this technology is utilised well is a core challenge to be overcome. The potential impact of such a change in behaviour is huge. The energy bill for New Zealand is approximately $18bn per year. If the available technology was utilised, that would reduce by $4bn per year.

Another challenge for energy efficiency culture change campaigns is that conceptually it is harder for people to understand – it isn’t tangible, people don’t for instance know how much energy a light bulb is using. This issue is compounded because whilst the impact of energy efficient behaviours is significant at the national level, for individual consumers and businesses the changes are not significant. Energy costs are usually a relatively small cost to the business, in the range of 2% to 8% of total cost to the business.

Any change within a business has to have an economic benefit, and it is easy to demonstrate that energy efficiency changes will result in less cost. However, this argument isn’t usually enough to make a change. In part, this is because the cost may be relatively small to other
changes that a business can make to become more efficient. But it is also because the opportunity to make change is not always well understood.

Opportunities for business to make efficiency changes arise in relation to capital investments and operating costs. When businesses make capital investments, this is an opportunity to introduce new energy efficient technology be that sensors for lighting, renewing a fleet of cars with more energy efficient vehicles, or building a state of the art energy efficient airport terminal. The challenge in these circumstances is to get businesses to be willing enough to make these types of capital investments. In terms of operating costs, the challenge is to change behaviours that people are generally used to doing. A lack of knowledge about alternatives, an inability to trust the wide range of information available and to know what is best in specific circumstances can add to the sense that it is all in the too hard.

In order to think about what change, a key problem business owners and managers experience is having the time available to do this. Often people do not have the mental or human space to stop and make energy efficient changes. This is especially true for small businesses that are usually busy working ‘in the business’, not ‘on the business’. This issue is complicated by not having the know-how to make changes, or not trusting the information available. It is easy to get advice on a specific energy efficiency product or problem, but energy efficiency is a system issue. Business owners need to be able to understand their entire system of energy use to be able to make choices that best meet their needs. This is different from getting bogged down in technical information about adopting specific products which can divert decision-makers from making the best overall choice for their company.

Energy efficient culture change campaigns have to meet the challenge that it is easy to make one-off changes in behaviour but much harder to make consistent changes overtime. Being an efficient energy user is not just changing one behaviour but many different behaviours which are most effective when done consistently overtime. A complication of addressing business behaviours is that changes in leadership can have an immediate and significant effect on behaviours – either accelerating or decelerating energy efficiency. There is a need to continual challenge the market paradigm in relation to energy efficiency.

A final challenge that energy efficiency culture change campaigns need to address is that society does not generally view these messages as something glamorous to adopt. The receptivity of hearing these messages needs to be recognised and the campaign needs to create a value that people can relate to. Advertising smoking was based on making it a glamorous, sexy and cool thing to do.

Implementation methodology

The importance of brand

Since 2008, EECA has taken the approach that it is critical to develop brands (EECA Business, Energy Star and ENERGYWISE) to create value in the market place about being energy
efficient. The brands are able to promote complex, sophisticated message not possible if energy efficiency messages were treated as separate individual actions. The brands communicate different messages which resonate with different audiences, but collectively they add-up to making good capital choices and using them wisely. The ENERGYWISE brand for example communicates messages about quality of life, being a good mum, living and working in a clean green New Zealand, and finding ways to save money.

Figure 13: EECA ENERGYWISE Brand

The brands also build trust in the market so that businesses and consumers know that the actions they take and the alternatives they want to adopt are energy efficiency products and behaviours. This is valuable for several reasons, especially because EECA works through partnerships - it is important that there is that a common, underlying trusted message communicated through these partnerships. The brand does this and gives their partners credibility, a tick of approval. So whilst EECA doesn't promote businesses or specific energy efficiency products, this is implicit.

The brand development approach to the culture change campaign enables a wide range of energy efficiency messages (home insulation, solar power, fuel efficient cars) to be communicated with an underlying message of the importance of being energy efficient. Specific messages may only run for a month, but each campaign contributes to building the brand. It means that when specific campaigns finish (as all campaigns do), the brand and underlying energy efficiency messages doesn’t – that is ongoing, there is just a different emphasis.

Supporting initiatives

EECA uses a wide range of initiatives to achieve behaviour change including mass media campaigns, energy rating labels, website tools and information, achievement awards, one-on-one consultancy, enforcement, standards, and funds designed to get uptake of new products or review practices.

Examples of the different initiatives

- Energy Spot is a mass media information campaign which offers tips and advice on energy saving to households and businesses. It is a mass media campaign that includes TV advertisement, websites, and social media.

- Energy Star is a premium product initiative which signals that a product or appliance (e.g. whiteware, imaging equipment, lighting), is one of the most energy efficient available in
New Zealand – it is in the top 25% of energy efficient options. The rating involves manufacturers changing their behaviour to compete on this quality dimension, as well as consumers and businesses making different capital investment choices.

- The Efficient Driving Tool is available on EECA’s website. It provides information as well as demonstrating what an individual can do to make specific changes to improve the energy efficiency of using their car. The tool shows ways an individual can drive and treat their car (e.g. regularity of air pressure checks and servicing, and use of bike racks) differently to save money.

- The EECA Awards celebrate excellence and innovation in energy efficiency and renewable energy within nine categories. This showcases what is possible in a wide range of businesses and celebrates success.

- 1-to-1 consultancy support is available for senior managers and business leaders to be provided advice (either directly or through partners) on how to improve energy use.

- Fuel economy labels must be displayed by motor vehicle traders. EECA has an enforcement role to check compliance with this statutory obligation.

- Heavy vehicle fleet performance reviews funds a trained heavy vehicle performance adviser (HVPA) to undertake a review of a firms’ heavy vehicle fleet operation and identify where fuel efficiency opportunities exist and how to implement changes.

- The Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) establish standards for energy performance that products must meet or exceed before they can be sold in New Zealand. Having MEPS in place raises the average efficiency of products available for sale, which can flow-on to help reduce your business operating costs.

- Energy rating labels provide consumers with information on how much electricity an appliance uses in a year, plus a star rating to show how energy efficient it is. All new whiteware and heat pumps available for sale in New Zealand must display an energy rating label. This is a regulatory requirement detailed under the MEPS.
The set of activities used to change behaviours differs slightly between consumers and businesses. Senior leaders and managers of large companies who are high users of energy are targeted through 1-to-1 consultant engagement and through award programmes. Small businesses are better targeted though mass media campaigns that give then 4 to 5 actions they could take to improve energy efficiency. Smaller firms are more limited in what they can adopt and do, and the impact is very different. Their choice might be to buy a more efficient printer rather than a substantial infrastructure investment. This is a same approach used to target messages to consumers. They are also given 4 to 5 options on what changes they can make in their life.

EECA also uses industry bodies as partner organisations to communicate messages to a particular industry. The Tourist Industry is an example of this. As a result the tourist industry has a much stronger understanding of the importance of energy efficiency for New Zealand ink and what is communicated to oversees visitors.

Culture change campaign messages & approaches

Message framework

Influencing changes in consumers requires a slightly different emphasis from influencing businesses. However there is a similar overall framework for the way in which messages are identified and developed. EECA take the view that messages need to first resonate with individuals. When they have, they can then be related to an individual’s family, workplace, community, country and then to the world. Messages which jump steps in this connection don’t connect with people and so don’t lead to change. For businesses, the approach needed is slightly different because people are not in control over their environment at work. So
messages in the workplace need to be tailored so that ‘what is good for my company’ is also ‘what is good for me.’

EECA positions their energy efficiency messages as positive messages. The messages are framed in terms of using energy to maximum benefit whilst using the least amount – as apposed to not using energy, or being punitive. Messages delivered are not about compliance. They are positioned as positive ‘how to’ messages that give people the tools to make a difference today as well as tomorrow.

The structure of EECA’s culture change campaign messages tend to follow a similar pattern and this is true for consumers and businesses. The following table illustrates the four steps in the structure. It shows that after defining the problem, options are given as to how they can make a difference both in terms of long-term behaviour change and what they can do immediately. The message is summarised by what would happen if everyone did this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Set up the problem in a unique way</td>
<td>Reducing carbon footprint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Show how the problem can be solved</td>
<td>Purchasing fuel efficient cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Give a tip on what can be done today</td>
<td>Drive more efficiently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Illustrate what would happen if we all did it</td>
<td>Contribute x amount to New Zealand’s carbon reduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This structure is implemented over varying timeframes, with the set of messages emerging overtime to the target audiences.

**Approach to businesses**

Better energy management and efficiency also brings other benefits: improved management systems and processes; low-carbon branding for exports; improved reputation and customer relations; demonstrated leadership; and staff motivation as well as cost savings. EECA’s approach to business is to leverage off these ‘co-benefits’ that accrue from improving energy management and efficiency.
Energy efficiency is good business sense

Figure 15: EECA Energy Spot – for businesses

EECA does this by illustrating how better business practices will lead to efficiencies that also have the advantage of using less energy. For some businesses, their international reputation as a low carbon emitter might be a strong value the company wants to promote, for another it might be the benefit of a healthy workforce which drives safely and is more productive. Whatever the particular benefit, the approach by EECA is to see how energy efficiency can be an impact of addressing these other issues. They are essentially all connected. It's all about finding the right leverage for a particular firm.

To make change in large firms it is essential that senior leaders and managers buy-in to the change. In large organisation, EECA focuses on getting energy efficiency discussions into the Board room and at the senior leadership and management level. EECA have found that the best way to get into an organisation is to leverage off existing infrastructure. A health and safety committee for example might be an existing infrastructure that would be useful in getting access to a firm.

Whilst changing individual behaviour is important, it is important to foster consistent behaviour change. This is difficult. For this reason, one of EECA’s approaches when working with businesses is to encourage changes to workplace features (like light sensors in low use areas) as well as encouraging people to switch off lights. The automation helps to support a change in people’s awareness and behaviour in relation to switching off unwanted lights – but there is also a consistent reduction in energy use.

Marketing budget

EECA has a significant annual marketing budget of $8 million. Their approach to focusing on brand development, which is supported with a range of specific messages, enables the budget
to be spread over a wider range of messages than would be possible if EECA were running a range of discrete campaigns (as they used to). EECA simply could not afford to do 12 months of marketing campaign for one product – there are too many of them and it would be very inefficient. Changing energy use is complex, the campaign needs to reflect this.

Outcomes

By taking a brand approach to behaviour change and delivering messages as part of the brand, EECA has found that not only have attitudes changed but there has been a much greater take up in their products. An example of this approach is that instead of first running an insulation campaign (which they did originally) and experiencing low uptake, EECA focused on creating an environment in which it was okay to talk about insulation and made it normal. Take-up after changing to a brand based approach has been much more successful.

A wide range of indicators are regularly tracked to measure performance of EECA’s energy efficiency culture change campaign strategy. Indicators show positive outcomes and include:

- Changing attitudes, for example in relation to insulation and energy efficiency
- Awareness of campaigns, such as 64% of adult New Zealanders having seen Energy Spot
- Take up of specific initiatives, like:
  - 164,000 insulation retrofits, ahead of target and under planned budget leading to an increase in the target of an additional 40,000
  - 97% compliance for displaying vehicle fuel economy labels in franchise dealerships and 79% compliance rates at used car dealers
  - 25,000 visits to EECA’s ENERGYWISE website interactive tool that allows them to check out the relative fuel efficiency of cars
  - 88 efficiency or audit projects for commercial buildings initiated with the potential to deliver 262 gigawatt hours in savings over 10 years
- Analysing the impact of different activities, such as:
  - finding that for every $1 invested in the Warm up New Zealand: Heat Smart initiative invested, more than $5 of benefit results
  - finding that the number of products and appliances included in the energy efficient products programme has saved consumers an estimated 15 Petajoules or $900m
  - finding that across all entrants to the EECA awards, over the lifetime of the project, the value of energy saved is $600m and the total CO₂ emissions reduced or avoided is 1.7m tonnes.

Figures given are from the 2011-12 EECA annual report and relate to that financial year.
Case study – Energy Star

The Energy Star programme is an example of one element of the culture change campaign that EECA operates. Energy Star falls under the ENERGYWISE brand. Energy Star uses energy rating labelling to provide consumers with energy efficiency information at the point of sale, and mandatory standards to remove the least energy efficient products from the market. The Energy Efficiency (Energy Using Products) Regulations 2002 requires certain efficiency standards be meet before products can be legally sold - products manufacturers produce are improved through ensuring minimum energy performance standard are reached. By getting products that use less energy to deliver the same performance, consumers save significantly on running costs over the entire life of the products.

**Figure 16: EECA Energy Star**

Consumers are encouraged to buy more energy efficient products at the point of sale by giving them clear, easy to understand comparative information about the energy efficiency of products they want to purchase. The Energy Star programme signals that an appliance/product is one of the top 25% most energy efficient options available in New Zealand. Energy Star targets manufacturers and consumers – both domestic and commercial - at the point of purchase.

EECA works with Australia to improve the efficiency of New Zealand products, under a joint programme called the Equipment Energy Efficiency (E3) Programme. The E3 programme develops energy efficiency measures for a range of residential, commercial, and industrial products, creating economic and environmental benefits. Aligning product energy efficiency measures across New Zealand and Australia reinforces development towards a single marketplace. It allows both countries to honour their commitments under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA). Aligning product standards also keeps business compliance costs low as they don't have to meet differing requirements in the two countries. So culture change campaigns work with other regulators, international businesses, and operate within international frameworks for reducing energy use.

The product programme (of which Energy Star is a component) has been successful. Highlights include:

- saving 3,250 GWh of electricity, worth around $726 million since it began in 2002,
- gaining improvements from a range of products, for example saving 413 GWh from improved whitewares and heat pumps which saved 357 GWh in 2011
• high brand recognition, with research finding the basis of Energy Star’s value is it being an independent programme, which provides a brand-mark to those appliances that are better than the rest in terms of energy efficiency – like the Heart Foundation “tick”, it’s a short cut to knowing you’re doing the right thing (without having to read the label).

The programme has cost to date $11.9 million which gives an estimated $60 of energy savings for every $1 EECA invests.

Culture change campaign success factors

The following factors were identified by EECA as critical success factors in changing energy use behaviour:

• Being strategic and developing recognisable brands that communicate complex values that speak to a wide range of people

• Pooling the entire marketing budget so that trade-offs can be made about what is the most efficient and value adding activity to proceed with.

• Targeting senior leaders and managers to adopt changes in large firms which are high users

• Ensuring scale of impact which means using partners and building recognisable brands

• Regularly monitoring indicators and adjusting campaigns to meet the market’s response to changing energy use behaviours.

Implications for workplace health and safety

The issues and strategies EECA have adopted are very appropriate for culture change campaigns in workplace health and safety.

• Health and safety is an easier concept for people to get traction as compared to energy efficiency. It’s generally accepted that it is wrong for employers to say that don’t care for their people, so that’s an opportunity. It’s also clear to employers that if staff are sick, sleepy, or injured there is a direct cost and implication for their business leading to wasted productivity – so the message is inherently more meaningful.

• Changing health and safety behaviours is very much like changing energy use behaviours because it is complex. Energy use behaviours can not be isolated in the way that they can be with the take-up of smoking or the wearing of seat belts (issue campaigns). There are many different energy use actions to adopt that need to be individualised to have an impact, this is quite different to issue campaigns where all that is needed is for one action to be taken by as many as possible. Issue based campaigning will not be successful for changing health and safety behaviours, hence the value of a brand.
The importance of developing a brand and leveraging off this can not be underestimated. It is a smart way to changing complex behaviours.

- Both health and safety, and energy efficiency culture change strategies benefit from approaching businesses in terms of the co-benefits that will flow. Health and safety is linked to organisational performance as is energy use - there are interconnected decisions to be made about how to change practices – especially for larger firms.

- Health and safety, like energy efficiency isn’t a ‘cool’ thing to be interested in. Any strategy needs to understand this and work to create a different value in relation to these issues. Both topics can been seen as nerdy or punitive so there needs to be a shift in perception and an alternative image built. Then the messages are much easier to promote.

- Change takes time and significant resource. Energy rating labelling, for example, has been in operation for 10 years and cost $11.9 million. This is just one component of EECA’s culture change campaign.

  - Enforcement and compliance should be branded separately from health and safety messages, otherwise the brand value is confused. To create a brand value that will influence people to change their behaviour, there needs to be separation from natural reactions people have to people in authority. Mixing the two isn’t helpful in getting people to adopt complex behaviour changes. The culture change campaign needs to consider the mindset of the receiver and how this might be challenged.

- The culture change campaign needs to respond to changing markets. If the campaign is successful, the market will change and respond to the brand. So the approach needs to be monitored and approached flexibly.